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Postwar United States military programs and the Latin American armed forces.

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POSTWAR UNITED STATES MILITARY PROGRAMS
AND THE LATIN AMERICAN ARMED FORCES

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM
AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE GRADUATE DIVISION
OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

By
Robert Ignatius Boland, Jr.

May 1962

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PREFACE

The author of a pioneer book dealing with Latin American armed forces, written only two years ago, remarked on the scarcity of earlier writing on this subject. He could make a similar observation concerning the period since his book appeared. The result has been that discussion of this important subject has expressed principally a single point of view, one which finds little merit in either the Latin American armed forces or the U.S. military assistance programs. In presenting an alternative view, derived to some extent from the same sources but with a different emphasis placed on the information, I hope to widen the range of judgments on which persons who are interested in the subject may draw in making their own assessments.

My views are no doubt influenced by my twenty-two years of service, both in the Army as an enlisted man and in the Navy as an officer, but my opinions have no official status and may not be widely shared by military personnel. I consider my outlook to be one of sympathy with the rationale of U.S. military assistance efforts and with the thinking of military men in our own and other countries, but not of bias toward either.

The most modest effort benefits from generous encouragement, and I cannot adequately express appreciation to

everyone who has given me incentive to pursue this study. However, special thanks are due to Professor Anthony E. Sokol, who devoted so much of his time and experience to the arduous task of pointing out the many rough spots in the work as it progressed and indicating how they could be smoothed out. To the extent that I have been faithful to his guidance, the study has gained clarity and lost some clumsiness. Professor John J. Johnson also has my gratitude for giving me more inspiration than he may have realized. The U.S. Navy deserves expression here of the appreciation I have long and deeply felt for the many rewarding opportunities with which I have been favored, and which are exemplified in the assignment to duty which made this and related studies possible.

R. I. Boland, Jr.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Among the most noticeable characteristics of the post-World War II period have been the immensity and the cost of world-wide military preparedness measures. The United States is engaged in speeding the process throughout the free world in order to counter adverse changes in the world power situation. Most of the political preliminaries already have been completed, the alliances formed, and the operating bodies established. What remains is the continuing process of supplying equipment to those U.S. allies who need it and training their men to use it, principally through military missions and advisory groups. This activity has proceeded at an uneven pace, but acceleration has been more characteristic of it than slackening has been. Both the scope of U.S. military assistance efforts and the stakes involved indicate the importance of this field and the desirability of further study of it.

Latin America commands more attention now than it did in earlier years, and discussion of military cooperation between that area and the United States, always important to some observers of military events, might now attract even more widespread interest.

True, the military threat to Latin America has seemed less clear and urgent than the dangers existing in other

areas. Consequently the underlying reasons for adopting and justifying military assistance to Latin America sometimes undergo extensive revision in conformity with changed situations. Some arguments are dropped as their applicability diminishes, only to be resurrected as new influences make them relevant once more. Others emerge from the background to become determinants. Recently reintroduced as a compelling reason in favor of military assistance to Latin American countries, for instance, is the problem of their internal security. This, and other premises for continuation of U.S. aid to Latin America, are discussed in subsequent chapters.

Not only have world conditions changed, but the thoughts of U.S. military leaders have altered, bringing revision of the composition of U.S. armed forces. Increased capabilities in terms of conventional weapons and guerrilla warfare are the most recent manifestations. The principal causes for the variations in military thought are the rapid technological advance in weapons systems and the frequent occurrence of indigenous, but Communist inspired, guerrilla warfare in the world. New equipment may be slow to get to Latin American armed forces from U.S. sources, but new ideas and the organization and tactics based on them are certain to be transmitted rather rapidly. The military forces of Latin America have experienced considerable improvement as a result of their own efforts and U.S. help, and they are able to adopt and apply new military techniques readily.

Improvements in the armed forces need not be confined to military capabilities, nor need the forces be influential

only in martial matters. Modern military strength requires a sound economic basis, reasonably large industrial capacity, supply facilities, mobility, and trained personnel. These are actually the needs of all underdeveloped countries themselves, distinct from their armed forces. Efforts to meet these requirements of the military forces further progress in national development, provided a reasonable balance between civilian and military needs is maintained. In this study, an attempt is made to indicate some of the military contributions to national growth and to evaluate the proportion of effort devoted to military ends.

International growth is very important too, especially now when so many new nations, often beset by serious problems, are emerging. World peace requires that all nations progress in stability and prosperity so that all may cooperate to help those countries which are having difficulty making the transition. The American republics furnish a model for peaceful settlement of disputes and for joint action through the Organization of American States. As members of the United Nations, they should be able to share the procedures and continue the cooperation they have developed in the OAS. Though the functions of these two organizations cover a wide range of political, social, and economic efforts, this study is chiefly concerned with the military support available to these organizations.

Many questions have been raised concerning the assumptions and interpretations which are the basis for U.S. military policy toward Latin America, as well as the effects of

the assistance programs and the extent to which their objectives are being attained. These questions are susceptible of different answers, and those presented here are sometimes at odds with those set forth in other writings on this subject.

CHAPTER II

HEMISPHERIC SECURITY: BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT

Postwar military assistance programs for Latin American countries began to have real significance only after passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which expanded the original Act of 1949 providing arms to NATO countries. To be comprehensible, however, the story must begin much earlier -- in the years when World War II was still confined to Europe. It was then that United States military missions displaced those of European nations, principally Germany, which had been engaged in training and advising the armed forces of the American nations. It was then, too, that commitments were made to furnish American equipment and facilities to Latin America, though redemption of the promises had to await U.S. involvement in the war and agreements on lend-lease pacts. These early missions and the material support given at that time provided the rationale and precedents for the subsequent renewal of these efforts under the revised Mutual Security Act, and the increase in the capabilities and equipment level of Latin American armed forces during World War II was the foundation for implementation of the Act. A brief description of the wartime provisions for hemispheric security and later steps to rebuild and improve the defensive posture is furnished as a basis for more detailed examination

of the influence of U.S. military programs in Latin America.

Prewar Military Missions and Attachés

The use of foreign military training missions had begun early and was fairly extensive in Latin America. Chile was receiving the services of a German mission in 1885, and General Koerner, who led it, later became chief of the Chilean general staff. He carried out a comprehensive program of renovation of the Chilean army. In 1899 a German mission was performing similar work in Argentina. Chile passed on her knowledge to Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, and El Salvador by sending them missions and to Ecuador and Nicaragua by receiving their officer students in her military schools. French missions were employed in Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Guatemala. Though the circumstances differed vastly, the United States trained armed forces in the countries she occupied in the early 1900's. These included Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama.¹

It was the State Department which, in early 1938, initiated the move to increase U.S. military assistance to Latin America. The Department had become alarmed over the increasing activity of Nazis and Fascists in this area and it proposed increases in U.S. activity through visits by U.S. ships and aircraft, visits by high-ranking Latin American officers to the U.S., school training in the U.S.

1. Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), pp. 32-33.

for junior officers, providing Army and Navy publications to military libraries in Latin America, and the assignment of more military attachés to Latin America. At the time, the U.S. Army had only six attachés and two small missions in the twenty Latin American republics.² The Navy had maintained missions in Brazil since 1918 and Peru since 1920.³ The recommendations of the State Department were carried out, though a shortage of qualified officers caused the increase in the number of attachés to proceed slowly. By December 1941, however, the Army was represented by attachés or missions in all of the Latin American capitals.⁴ All Axis missions had been eliminated by this time.⁵

Wartime Arms Supply to Latin America

In 1939, the combined numerical strength of the active military forces of Latin America exceeded considerably that of the United States.⁶ However, the two groups were not of comparable quality, and the countries of the hemisphere, with the help of the United States, strove to upgrade the Latin American armed forces. The principal thought at first was the defense of the Americas, especially the protection of the Panama Canal and the preclusion of an enemy assault on the hump of Brazil from Africa, 1800 miles away. It was evident that only the United States could effectively counter

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2. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Western Hemisphere, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Vol. XII of United States Army in World War II (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 173.
 3. Lieuwen, p. 188.
 4. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 174 and 185.
 5. Lieuwen, p. 191.
 6. Conn and Fairchild, p. 416.

an invasion of northeastern Brazil, but the Brazilian Army wanted to improve its own ground forces so that they could defend the bulge area without American ground assistance.⁷ By early 1942 it was agreed the U.S. ground combat forces could be stationed there provided enough military equipment were delivered to permit Brazilian and American troops to provide joint defense on an equal footing.⁸

Because of her strategic importance Brazil received about three-fourths of all the lend-lease aid given to Latin America during and after the war.⁹ Mexico received more than ten percent of the total lend-lease deliveries, since her proximity to the United States allowed her to make important contributions of radar sites and airfields and made her security from subversion imperative.¹⁰ The portion of lend-lease assistance given to other Latin American countries was thus quite small.

Most of the lend-lease assistance was furnished in the form of airfield construction and planes. Much was for major equipment such as coast artillery guns, light tanks, and trucks. Very little was for personal arms—rifles, pistols or machine guns. There was a need for small arms, however. An early request by Mexico was for 50,000 rifles, among other things, but it was turned down because legislation at that time did not permit the sale of the items she

7. Conn and Fairchild, p. 267.

8. Conn and Fairchild, p. 314.

9. Conn and Fairchild, p. 329.

10. Conn and Fairchild, p. 353.

requested.¹¹ Brazil sent 7000 of her own rifles to the Uruguayan Army in 1940 when a Nazi plot was uncovered in Uruguay.¹² In 1942 a guard force of ninety Brazilians at Natal airfield had only fifteen pistols.¹³ General Marshall thought that it should be U.S. policy not to sell small arms, but a contrary policy decision was made by accident when President Roosevelt promised to furnish rifles and machine guns in a conversation with the President of Haiti.¹⁴ Many similar requests and needs were filled later as U.S. production permitted.

There were many other needs, of course. U.S. liaison officers who toured South American countries in 1940 found them lacking in even the essentials of self-defense, needing airfields, planes, patrol craft, artillery, and even efficient intelligence services.¹⁵ The Chilean military establishment was notoriously weak by this time, and the large German element in the country was cause for concern.¹⁶ No nation in Latin America was considered capable of making a major military contribution to the common defense.¹⁷ Brazil, the defense of whose northeastern bulge was considered so important, was ill prepared militarily for its size and wealth. The Navy was antiquated. The Army strength was 66,000 men, but it lacked modern equipment, and it was concentrated in the south.

11. Conn and Fairchild, p. 353.

12. Conn and Fairchild, p. 274.

13. Conn and Fairchild, p. 321.

14. Conn and Fairchild, p. 210.

15. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1952), p. 617.

16. Langer and Gleason, p. 276.

17. Lieuwen, p. 189.

The Air Force was weaker than that of either Argentina or Peru. Lack of industrial capacity made Brazil dependent on sources abroad for arms.¹⁸

The United States could do little to supply deficiencies. In the prewar period, the laws did not permit the sale of any but obsolete and surplus material. Latin American countries did not want this equipment, and those which accepted some of it had problems with assembly, with spare parts, and with ammunition supplies. Besides, in 1940 the U.S. was too hard pressed to equip its own expanding forces and meet its commitments to Great Britain to be able to provide even token shipments of modern arms to Latin America. Passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941 ended legal limitations, but Pearl Harbor upset all plans and schedules for 1942 delivery of arms to Latin America, and regular deliveries were not possible until the spring of 1943.¹⁹

By that time it was evident that invasion of the hemisphere was no longer a possibility. Therefore the question was raised as to whether or not it was desirable to continue to supply Latin America with arms, as had been planned. The share given to some states was beginning to arouse jealousy and distrust in others, as had been foreseen in 1941. A revised policy was adopted, under which arms continued to be provided but for purposes which differed in scope from those of earlier policies. Material was now furnished only for anti-submarine operations, overseas offensive operations,

18. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 266-267.

19. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 211-235.

maintenance and repair of existing equipment, and the preservation of internal stability. The effect was to reduce lend-lease aid to the greatest possible extent.²⁰

A change of policy leading to reduction of aid was in line with the basic philosophy of lend-lease aid to Latin America. Partly in recognition of postwar problems of restoring law and order, and partly in fear of possible control by subversive or Axis elements, the policy established in 1941 withheld offensive armaments from the Latin American arms program. In this category were heavy and medium bombardment aircraft, bombs heavier than 300 pounds, medium and heavy tanks, chemical warfare agents, artillery above six inch caliber, combat ships, torpedo boats, and similar equipment. When a border dispute between Peru and Ecuador erupted into hostilities in 1941, delivery of weapons of any kind to these two countries was suspended until the dispute was settled.²¹

Other significant items should be mentioned briefly in connection with arms supply to Latin America. The United States was instrumental in getting German arms into Brazil at a time when supply by the U.S. was impossible. Brazil had ordered artillery from Germany on a barter basis before the war. Only part of the equipment was delivered by the time war broke out. Later, as a result of U.S. persuasion, the British allowed an American ship to load some missing

20. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 235-236.

21. Conn and Fairchild, p. 229.

parts which had been interned in Lisbon for delivery to Brazil. By November 1941 Brazil had obtained two hundred guns from Germany, though lack of parts made some of these unusable.²² After lend-lease arrangements were made, supply of U.S. equipment to Latin America was considerable, but the Latin American share was only one percent of the total expenditures by the U.S. in this program. Argentina received no arms from the U.S. because of her reluctance to cooperate in hemisphere defense measures. No reverse lend-lease was requested of the Latin American countries, since their governments could not finance such aid, nor did the localities in which the United States operated have resources for local supply.²³

Inter-American Wartime Cooperation

Most of the countries of Latin America were anxious to contribute to offensive operations against the Axis as well as to the defensive effort in the hemisphere. However, in none of these countries could forces be equipped and trained quickly enough and completely enough to form an effective combat contingent of sufficient strength. Brazil made the largest contribution of combat forces, as might be expected of the recipient of so large a share of U.S. assistance. Still, Brazil had been so weak that the Brazilian Army had objected to severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis in 1942 because it feared this step might lead to a

22. Conn and Fairchild, p. 271.

23. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 230-237.

war which it was in no condition to fight. President Vargas did sever relations, however, and soon afterwards Brazil wanted to take an active part in the war. The U.S. Department of State urged the sending of a Brazilian battalion to North Africa, but the U.S. Army declined on the grounds that this would make it necessary to send troops of other Latin American nations too, and that none were ready. By 1944, however, Brazil was able to send twenty-five thousand ground troops and an air squadron to the Italian theater, where they acquitted themselves well.²⁴ Mexico also sent a small force to combat. The 201st Fighter Squadron fought in Luzon, Philippine Islands, after training in the United States in 1944.²⁵ That only these two countries could send combat forces abroad, and do so relatively late in the fighting, is an indication of the difficulties involved in readying the armed forces of willing nations, not a manifestation of unwillingness to cooperate in the war effort.

All of the Latin American countries except Argentina cooperated to the extent that their endowments permitted and that use could be made of them, though most of these nations could make little or no contribution without help from the United States. Sixteen of the Latin American nations permitted development of naval and air bases in their territory that were available to the United States for regular or emergency use during the war. Ferrying aircraft

24. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 313-329.

25. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 356, 363.

to theaters of war would have been impossible without them, and ocean patrols would have been much more difficult. All of Latin America rendered economic aid of great value to the war effort of the United Nations.²⁶ A less spectacular, and perhaps less vital, effort was the political cooperation of Latin American countries in the Pan-American Conferences and in the Inter-American Defense Board, with resultant harmony and coordination. Some of the wartime declarations and policies have had far-reaching and continuing results.

A major contribution by Latin American countries was the control of elements of their societies which could have posed a serious threat to hemispheric security through subversion. Elimination of foreign missions has already been mentioned, but foreign influence remained. Certain Latin American Governments were afraid that their large German, Italian, and Japanese settlements contained trained Fifth Columns ready to align the continent with the Axis. These fears were not unfounded. The Nazi government made a strong effort to exert influence over Germans abroad ever since it came to power in Germany, and there were no less than 300,000 native Germans and 1,250,000 persons of German descent in Latin America toward whom influence was directed. Propaganda from Nazi embassies and pressure from German businessmen were present in all countries of Latin America.²⁷ In a few of them, actual plots and attempts at insurrection were

26. Conn and Fairchild, p. 237.

27. Langer and Gleason, pp. 607-614.

discovered, such as those in Argentina and Chile in the summer of 1940.²⁸ In any event, one of the major aims of the United States was the buildup of Latin American forces to be strong enough to insure internal order, and much of the arms supply program was tailored to meet this goal.

One possible avenue for subversive activity and sabotage that was particularly worrisome was the extensive operation of airlines by foreign nationals in Latin America. Colombia was an especially sensitive area in this respect. The United States ultimately gained control of these airlines through the manipulations of the Pan-American Airways Company, acting as agent for the U.S. government, with the cooperation of the Latin American governments. The foreign airlines were suspected of reconnaissance for Axis submarines and guidance of Axis shipping past British blockade ships, since an increased tempo of operations of the airlines coincided with increased activity by the Axis ships. The possibility of a more or less personal raid on the Panama Canal by one or more of the young German pilots was considered a serious threat. There can be no doubt that German pilots gained familiarity with Latin America, that the airfields owned by foreign lines could have been useful to an invading force, and that contact with Axis diplomats and agents was maintained through the airlines. Elimination of foreign aviation interests removed an actual threat, and a much greater potential threat, to hemispheric security.

28. Langer and Gleason, p. 685.

Pan-American Airways went on to construct or enlarge many air facilities in Latin America in cooperation with the several governments there.²⁹

A rather unusual feature of inter-American relations before and during World War II was President Roosevelt's reluctance to make firm commitments for bases in the Caribbean area for U.S. use. In 1938 he had evolved the idea of Pan-American sovereignty or trusteeship over Caribbean islands belonging to European powers. This idea was reinforced by the view that for the United States to acquire any of these islands, by whatever means, would conflict with American policy of not seeking territorial expansion and would result in unfavorable world opinion. The President felt secure in this position because he was certain that in the event of war, the Latin American Republics would be on the side of the United States in common defense, so that there was no need to acquire or lease facilities in peace time. The President was opposed to transfers of sovereignty over European colonies in the New World to any non-American power, and the State Department published a memorandum to this effect.³⁰ The Havana Conference of foreign ministers of American states had given sanction to President Roosevelt's trusteeship idea in July 1940 by passage of the Act of Havana,

29. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 238-259. The story of Pan-American Airways' efforts is a rather involved one, but it is presented very lucidly in this source.

30. Langer and Gleason, pp. 622-625.

which provided for inter-American administration of European possessions should it become necessary to take them over in order to prevent the Axis from getting control of them.³¹

However, base rights were acquired unilaterally soon afterward when Great Britain gave the United States sites in British possessions in return for destroyers and other arms. The United States military forces were somewhat indifferent concerning these acquisitions and considered them little more than an expedient to make the transfer of destroyers acceptable to America. These bases were made available to all American Republics, in keeping with the Havana agreement, when the United States circulated a note to that effect to all the Latin American governments.³² Although the destroyer-base arrangement reduced the need for bases in Latin American countries and possessions, the United States did ultimately acquire some. Early plans called for U.S. use of facilities only when a Latin American state specifically asked for the assistance of United States forces.³³ The Latin American countries were wary of stationing U.S. troops on their territory as security forces or airplane mechanics, though they did not object to use of airfields by military aircraft, nor the use of specified ports by naval vessels. The U.S. was equally wary of putting troops in civilian clothes at various installations, as Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela proposed. However, small U.S. Marine security companies were allowed

31. Conn and Fairchild, p. 49.

32. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 51-62.

33. Conn and Fairchild, p. 191.

at Belem, Natal, and Recife within two weeks of the attack on Pearl Harbor, after considerable negotiation at high levels. U.S. Forces in Brazil were gradually augmented after this time.³⁴ Mexico was equally reluctant to allow the use of airfields as operating bases until after she formally entered the war in May 1942, and it took almost another year to reach an agreement that permitted U.S. troops to be stationed at these installations in small numbers and under restrictive conditions.³⁵

The Mutual Security Act

Many of the considerations which were associated with World War II programs of military supply and cooperation between the United States and Latin America have reappeared in the application of the Mutual Security Act to the western hemisphere. The Act was initiated in 1949 as a means of providing arms to NATO members in order that Communism might be contained. The Korean police action, and the inability of some members of the United Nations to respond to the U.N. Security Council's request for aid in stopping hostilities, caused the U.S. to expand the scope of the Act, to extend its operation to Latin America.

A sizable amount of military equipment had been furnished to Latin America under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act during World War II. However, with the termination of this program, the equipment deteriorated for lack of spare

34. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 303-306.

35. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 346-350.

parts and maintenance. The Latin American countries were unable or unwilling to spend the money required to keep their U.S.-supplied arms in optimum operating condition. In some instances they preferred to buy new arms from European suppliers instead. In 1945 the Inter-American Defense Board had recommended standardization of arms, in part so that the supply of spare parts and ammunition would not be cut off by hostilities outside the hemisphere, and the desirability of such a program was generally recognized. It was imperiled, however, by the inability of Latin American nations to continue to purchase the requisite materials in the United States. Efforts by the Truman administration to get Congressional action on bills to continue inter-American military assistance by supplying equipment had failed in 1946 and 1947.³⁶

By 1947, the economic plight of Europe, and the possibility of Communist exploitation of this condition, gave rise to the Marshall Plan for systematic reconstruction on a regional scale. Economic recovery and rising standards of living were assumed to be an effective device to counter local subversion arising from internal Communist penetration. However, a series of Soviet maneuvers, starting with Russian refusal to join the Marshall Plan, and including conflict in Greece and Turkey, the take-over of Czechoslovakia, the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist bloc, and the Berlin blockade, made Europe anxious about direct Soviet

36. Lieuwen, pp. 196-198.

aggression and the lack of military means to oppose it. In 1949 the United States took the lead in establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which tied military assistance to a defensive alliance of Atlantic nations. At the same time that the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was proposed, providing the means to modernize the armed forces of European NATO members and continue previous programs of support to Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Philippines and South Korea. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program which was enacted was carefully designed to avoid an arms race, to concentrate primarily on modernization.

The NATO pact had a precedent in the 1947 Rio de Janeiro defense agreement entitled the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Both treaties declared that an attack on any one of the signatories would be considered an attack on all and called for concerted action including the use of armed force. The Rio pact did not provide for material assistance to Latin America, however, as the NATO agreement did for Europe.³⁷

At a meeting of foreign ministers of the American States in Washington in 1950 it was determined that the collective defense provisions of the Rio treaty should be implemented by strengthening those forces which were adapted to hemisphere defense through cooperative development. The

37. Lorna Morley and Felix Morley, The Patchwork History of Foreign Aid (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Association, 1961), pp. 18-30.

ministers directed the Inter-American Defense Board, as an operating body of the Organization of American States, to plan for this joint effort. General Bolte, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Board, appeared before Congressional committees considering the Mutual Defense Assistance Act to support changes to the Act which would provide for inclusion of Latin America in its terms. Among other things, his testimony emphasized that a program for rehabilitation of World War II equipment would distribute responsibility for the security of the hemisphere, and of the United States, for which U.S. troops would have to be used otherwise, and that this would be done at a lower cost through the use of local troops in Latin America.³⁸

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 provided grants-in-aid to Latin America for maintaining forces for which a role in hemispheric defense had been assigned. These forces were a relatively small percentage of the total troops strength of Latin America, and the money furnished by the Act was only five percent of the total defense budget of Latin America. Equipment needs beyond those covered by the grants could still be filled by purchase in the United States. However, this portion of the Act was not realistic in that the costs were not adjusted for age and condition of the equipment involved nor could the purchases be made on credit, until

38. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1951, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 391-398.

the 1957 modifications to the Act made these steps possible.³⁹

Other modifications have been made over the years. The Act of 1951 incorporated all existing foreign assistance activities (except the Export-Import Bank loans) under a single act, in recognition of the interdependence of military, economic, and technical aid. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 replaced the earlier Act, which was to terminate in 1954.⁴⁰

Since legislators in the United States are cautious about aid to Latin America because it may help to perpetuate dictatorial regimes, take on the character of an arms race, or discourage self-help where it is practicable, the Act has been amended to provide that internal security will not be the basis for military assistance, and that a ceiling of \$55,000,000 shall be placed on arms aid to Latin America. Additional proposals and discussions have included channeling aid through the Organization of American States, limitations on shipment of small arms, payment with strategic materials, and a proposal for disarmament made by Costa Rica. Each of these limitations has some merit, but each has some disadvantages as well, and the program has not been basically changed over the years.

Major changes were sought by the Kennedy Administration in the 1961 hearings on the program. New legislation was proposed to replace the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

39. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1957, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 330.

40. Morley and Morley, p. 30.

Five features of the new act were to be, briefly, continuing authority for appropriations, strengthening of internal security capabilities, removal of the ceiling on the grants for military material to Latin America, removal of some conditions respecting eligibility for aid, and provision for special Presidential powers to deal with emergencies.

The 1961 hearings brought out some of the continuing features of the Mutual Security Act. The grant aid has been furnished only to the twelve nations which have an assigned role in hemisphere defense. These are: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Cuba. Deliveries to the last two on the list have been suspended in view of the conditions prevailing in these countries. It was argued that the amendment which limited assistance for the purpose of improving internal security was too restrictive. The reasoning was that the Latin American forces which are getting U.S. material and training because of their part in hemisphere defense plans are the most capable units in their respective countries, yet they could not be used legally to combat internal disturbance in these countries without U.S. authorization. A realistic appraisal indicated that the legal bar would not deter use of these forces if the need should arise.⁴¹

41. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on International Development and Security, 87th Cong., 2d. Sess., 1961, Part 2, pp. 598-600, 668, 776. Military assistance to the Dominican Republic will probably be renewed. The New York Times, January 27, 1962, p. 36 reported the sending of a survey team to consider the possibility of renewal of the program.

The discussion and the requested changes, referred to above, were designed to tailor military aid to the Alliance for Progress by providing for more flexibility and for longer-range development. As in the earlier Mutual Security legislation, economic and military aid are to be considered together. An increase in military assistance of \$285,000,000 more than had been proposed in President Kennedy's budget was requested. The President said that the increase was necessary to meet the crises in Southeast Asia and the rising threat of Communism in Latin America. Aides later indicated that the increase in funds for Latin America would be small and would be used chiefly to strengthen the internal security forces of those Central American republics which are threatened with insurrections led by pro-Castro elements.⁴²

Maintaining and modernizing those Latin American armed forces which are ear-marked for hemisphere defense has been a continuing effort since 1952. The sums provided for this purpose have been relatively small with respect to the total U.S. assistance effort, never higher than two percent. However, the importance of the program is not measured in dollars or percentages but in its effects in terms of security and solidarity. These will be discussed at some length in later chapters.

Postwar Missions, MAAG's and Attachés

In the formation of an effective armed force, training is at least as important as being well equipped. To help

42. The New York Times, 27 May 1961, p. 1.

train the armed services in Latin America, the United States maintains small missions, representing one or more of the branches of service, in each of the Latin American republics except Mexico and, now, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Even Costa Rica, which has a Civil Guard force rather than an army, is assisted by a U.S. Army mission. A tabulation of the missions operating in Latin America in Fiscal 1962 is presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1

U.S. MISSIONS IN LATIN AMERICA - 1962^a

<u>Country</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
Argentina	X			X
Bolivia	X			X
Brazil	X	X	X	X
Chile	X	X	X	X
Colombia	X	X	X	X
Costa Rica	X			
Ecuador	X	X		X
El Salvador	X			X
Guatemala	X			X
Haiti		X	X	X
Honduras	X			X
Nicaragua	X			X
Panama	X			
Paraguay	X			X
Peru	X	X		X
Uruguay	X			X
Venezuela	X	X	X	X

a. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 98, 103, and 178-179.

The mission personnel may give tactical advice in the areas of their specialties, but the principal efforts are to instruct Latin American forces in the mechanics of the use of U.S. equipment, to assist with maintenance and repair of the material, and to help prepare Latin American armed forces for joint operations with each other and with U.S. forces. This last is a particularly important function of the naval missions, since the navies' roles are more apt to involve coordination within a given force. Some of the naval exercises in past years have made such requirements, and standardized formations and procedures are necessary for effective combat operation. The methods of the missions differ somewhat depending on the personnel assigned to them and the country involved, but in at least one case, individual efforts were made by mission personnel to translate U.S. instruction books and to conduct classes which gave both formal and practical instruction.⁴³

In most cases, the missions also advise the governments of the countries concerned as to procurement of materials. In some countries of the free world, this function is performed by Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), and such groups were once common in Latin America, but they have been superseded in all the Latin American countries except for Naval MAAG's in Argentina and Uruguay.

43. Interview with LTJG Joseph Jones, USN, May 17, 1961. LTJG Jones was formerly attached to the U.S. Naval Mission, Brazil.

Attachés are in a different category than mission personnel. They are concerned with overt intelligence functions, representation of their country in military matters in foreign countries, and military advice to United States Ambassadors in foreign capitals. They have no responsibility for supply or training of the armed forces of the country to which they are assigned and normally do not interfere with these functions in any way. The nature of their duties is indicated by the fact that Army attachés are assigned to all countries of Latin America, including Mexico and Cuba, but excepting Panama, where the Governor of the Canal Zone performs the function, and the Dominican Republic, which has a Marine attaché. The Navy has attachés in every country of South America which has ocean frontage, and also in Mexico, but none in Central America, where navies are very small.⁴⁴

Postwar Bases

Most of the bases developed in Latin America during World War II could be more accurately described as commercial airfield and seaport facilities which were made available to U.S. forces for minor supply and repair and, in the case of aircraft, to furnish a route short enough for trans-Atlantic flights. The difficulties experienced in getting small security forces stationed at the largest and most important

44. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 98, 103, and 178-179.

facilities gave ample indication that they could not come under U.S. control other than in a very limited and temporary way, and they ceased to be U.S. bases after the war. In 1962, the United States has only four bases in the Latin American area, none of which is strictly a World War II base. The United States has had bases at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and in the Panama Canal Zone since the turn of the century, long before World War II. Two missile tracking stations, one in the Dominican Republic and one on Fernando de Naranho Island, Brazil, have been constructed in the late 1950's, and they are not bases in the same sense as were the World War II installations.⁴⁵

The United States still has limited facilities and rights at the sites of the Antilles bases obtained from Great Britain in the destroyer-base arrangements of 1940. Plans to grant independence to the West Indies Federation in 1962 meant that agreements with Great Britain had to be terminated and new ones negotiated with the Federation. An agreement signed on 10 February 1961 permits the United States to operate a few small electronic and oceanographic stations in the several islands of the Federation, but activity at the Antilles bases had been curtailed greatly after the war, and the agreement makes no real change in their status. Provision was made for the use by the United States of the naval base at Trinidad, and specifically Waller Field, only in the event of an emergency arising out

45. Lieuwen, p. 223.

of hostilities. A limited agreement was made for use of the fleet anchorage in peacetime, on presentation of appropriate notice.⁴⁶

The present system of bases is not important in terms of size or amount of current activity, then, although some of the installations have important, but limited, technical functions. However, retention of base rights has some significant features. It prevents potential enemies from acquiring them. Future developments, such as anti-missile missiles, may make the base areas important in the next few years. Anti-submarine patrols and aerial reconnaissance patrols from Caribbean bases may become necessary in support of limited actions. Perhaps more important than any of these in time of peace is liaison between American and foreign nationals, supplementing that achieved by the missions and attachés.

All of the activities described above introduce the influence of the United States into Latin America. There are a few additional military activities which also exert an influence, such as attendance by Latin American officers at U.S. military schools and work carried on by military bodies within the OAS. The effect and effectiveness of these are discussed in the following chapters.

46. U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4734, U.S. Defense Areas in the Federation of the West Indies, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1961.

CHAPTER III

DEFENSE FORCES AND THE NEED FOR THEM

Latin American countries are not alone in feeling a need for modern armed forces. All but a very few of the world's sovereign states support sizable military establishments. A rough measure of the intensity of this feeling in the Latin American republics is the size of their total defense budget—an annual sum of more than one billion dollars, or twenty times the amount furnished to them by the United States as grant aid. There are many people who feel that this is an excessive amount, questioning the validity of assumptions which are the basis for U.S. support of these armed forces. If there is no threat to the security of the hemisphere both from within and from without, or if defense against this threat can be met better with forces other than the Latin American ones, there is little justification for so high a level of expenditure by either the United States or its hemispheric neighbors for armed might in Latin America. However, recent events in Cuba and elsewhere have made some of the arguments for military strengthening of Latin America more cogent and less speculative.

Lead Time for Military Forces

Most discussions concerning maintenance of strong armed forces in Latin America hinge on the urgency of the

need for them. To be meaningful, discussion of the current hemisphere defense program must take into consideration the length of time it takes to form an effective armed force. Much depends on the starting point, of course. A demonstration of the difficulties involved, even when the starting point is with an existing trained organization, was provided when some National Guard and Organized Reserve units were placed on active duty in the United States late in 1961. As a result of this experience, the President and his military advisers have decided that a better course is to increase the number of men on active duty with the armed forces and to reduce the authorized strength of reserve forces.¹

The equipment used by modern military forces is complex and requires a great deal of technical knowledge and skill. Even when the manpower pool from which the forces are made is highly literate and is experienced in an industrial society, and the men are integrated into an existing efficient armed force, it takes an appreciable time for recruits to become effective members of the force. In a discussion of the West German Army, Hanson Baldwin stated that, if that army is to become a good one, the draft would have to be extended to eighteen months, since a one year period means that conscripts are returned to civilian life just when they have attained an acceptable standard of training.² If the source of conscripts is an illiterate group, composed largely

1. The New York Times, December 3, 1961, p. 1 and December 15, 1961, p. 1.

2. The New York Times, September 16, 1961, p. 4.

of subsistence farmers and others who lack mechanical skills, much more time is required for training in literacy, or the time devoted to learning by doing and through example must be increased, or both of these courses must be adopted. A permanent force of experienced, professional military men must be maintained at all times to impart the requisite skill to new personnel, or else the lead time needed to form an effective force must be extended considerably.

The technological requirements for maintenance and use of aircraft, warships, and armored forces are clear, but even the job of infantry rifleman has become much more complex over the years. Infantry action must be coordinated with other arms in most situations, and it has been necessary to increase mobility and communications capabilities of infantry groups to meet this requirement. Each advance in efficiency in the employment of infantry has added complications. Guerrilla training is even more complicated as a rule because, in addition to mastery of usual infantry skills, competence in the use of high explosives, in hand-to-hand combat, and in survival techniques are minimum requirements.

The equipment which has made military operations more complex requires a long lead time itself before it becomes available in the field. This remains true when several steps are eliminated, such as research and design, manufacture of special tools, etc. Even if all materials are furnished from an external source, problems of expansion of production and of transportation require time for their solution. The

experiences of Latin America in World War II indicate that the time involved can be considerable.³

The Size of Latin American Armed Forces

It is tempting to think that because the armed forces of Latin America have seemed to be bigger than necessary to meet apparent threats in the past they may be reduced at the present time. Actually the threat to hemispheric security is becoming more prominent with time, and its dimensions are seen to be larger than was believed, or perhaps to be increasing. The size of the armed forces cannot be based solely on the presumed magnitude of current threats but must anticipate future conditions because of the lead time involved. Revelations of Communist influence in Cuba become progressively more ominous, and internal threats to order are evident in the violence attending changes of government in the Dominican Republic, in Brazil, and in Ecuador in late 1961 and early 1962. These conditions indicate the existence of sufficient menace to security to require fairly large forces on active duty and to require that these forces be highly trained so that they may be expanded quickly.

Determination of optimum size for a country's armed forces is difficult and imprecise. Certainly no country of Latin America should keep up as large a force in proportion to its population as does the United States. None has commitments elsewhere on the globe. None has any strength devoted

3. Supra, chap. 11, passim.

to ballistic missiles. Some have almost no need for a navy; others require forces only for limited and local use. Latin American air forces need no heavy bombers and relatively few tactical aircraft. Based on these considerations, Latin America would not seem to need more than a fraction of the numerical strength maintained by the United States. In fact, Latin America has only about one-fifth as much strength as does the U.S. If the United States, with a population about equal to that of all Latin America and with considerably less than half the area, had armed forces responsible only for training, protection against subversion, and resistance to small scale assault, only a minority of the citizens would feel that one-fifth of its present strength would be excessive for these purposes. A comparison of armed forces of all members of the OAS, expressed in terms of the number of civilians for each member of the armed forces, is given in Table 2.

Many people who influence or shape the U.S. Military Assistance Program have gone on record as favoring a reduction of the total strength of Latin American armed forces. Those who recommend curtailment of expenditures for arms for Latin America, most of whom are not officials of the government of the U.S., do not believe that Latin America has a real role in hemispheric defense. Those who are U.S. government officials often indicate a belief that Latin American forces other than those needed to carry out the assigned roles in defense of the hemisphere are excessive.

TABLE 2
APPROXIMATE CIVILIAN/MILITARY RATIO
FOR MEMBERS OF THE OAS

Country	Number of civilians per man in uniform
United States	xxx 72
Argentina	xxxxxxx 185
Bolivia	xxxxxxxxxxxxx 340
Brazil	xxxxxxxxxxx 260
Chile	xxxxxx 164
Colombia	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 455
Costa Rica	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 958
Dominican Republic	xxxxxxx 229
Ecuador	xxxxxxx 250
El Salvador	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 373
Guatemala	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 418
Haiti	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 678
Honduras	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 650
Mexico	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 721
Nicaragua	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 392
Paraguay	xxxxxx 185
Peru	xxxxxxxxxxx 280
Uruguay	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 433
Venezuela	xxxxxxxxxxx 348
Latin America Total	xxxxxxxxxxxxx 353

*The figures are based on those given in The Statesman's Year-book, 1961-1962. Many population figures are estimates, and in some cases the armed forces' strength is listed by number of battalions, whose strength is also estimated. Cuba and Panama have been omitted from the table, since they are special cases.

Officials of the U.S. Department of Defense or of its subordinate agencies have not indicated that they share this belief.⁴ Reduction of armament should never be ruled out, but it must be approached on the basis of needs. There are many considerations which affect the size of the armed forces, but their role of opposition to a possible invasion of the hemisphere is probably paramount in importance and certainly the principal area of controversy.

The Threat from Without

In discussing U.S. military policy, a prominent writer in the field states:

The policy, however, rests on the questionable assumption that Latin America 'is threatened by Communist aggression both from within and without.' No serious observer believes that Soviet armies are about to invade the Western Hemisphere. Between Russia and Latin America stand the NATO powers in Western Europe, the Atlantic Ocean, and the United States navy and air force. The western side of the area is even more firmly shielded by the vast expanses of the Pacific and by United States control over the approaches to the hemisphere. With such natural geographic shields and such powerful anti-Communist allies, the idea of a threat of Communist

4. Lieuwen, p. 252, proposes that the U.S. adopt "a policy aimed at promoting lower levels of armament by cutting back military aid and encouraging Latin America to disarm [which] will, of course, involve shelving the collective defense 'myth'." Charles O. Porter and Robert J. Alexander in The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America are in essential agreement with this position. Senator Church in U.S. Senate Hearing on the Mutual Security Act before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. gave his opinion that no one from the State Department or the Defense Department could make a case for hemispheric defense (p. 84). The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy Rubottom, in the same hearings, said that most Latin American countries could reduce the size of their military establishments, but the U.S. did not determine the size and was only interested in the regional defense aspects (pp. 349-350).

aggression from without is very remote. In the event of general war, of course, the Soviet Union might conceivably direct a small part of its attention to Latin America, whose great cities are vulnerable to missile attacks from submarines, but the main objects of attack would surely be the United States, its European allies, and its base system. The fact is that, in military terms, Latin America is more isolated than any other major area in the world from the East-West struggle. It would be hard to imagine a more unlikely target for an armed Soviet assault.⁵

To dismiss all possibility of aggression from without, simply because of the remoteness of the possibility of invasion by Russian forces, is a dangerous procedure. Military aggression may take many forms other than mass transportation of troops. Communist action is not restricted to Soviet forces, nor are Communists the only possible invaders. Discussion of the merit of a given policy should not be restricted to a statement made years earlier of one of the fundamentals on which the policy rested, but should include all current considerations.

Russian submarines could be the instrument for one type of invasion of Latin America. The use of submarines as troop carriers constitutes diversion from more profitable employment of their characteristics as a rule. However, if a territory is to be vanquished by a fifth column, directed by relatively few nationals of the attacking country who can assume key position, submarines are the optimum means for getting them in position for simultaneous initiation of

5. Lieuwen, pp. 208-209. In presenting this view, Mr. Lieuwen has cited a statement appearing in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin, March 30, 1954. He exempts political and economic aggression from this discussion of military aspects.

such an effort in many locations. This is a particularly strong possibility in South America because so many of its countries are centered on a single, major, coastal metropolis, as much able to control the country in enemy hands as it does now in the hands of its own government.

An attempt to seize control of Latin America concurrently with a general attack on the United States is possible also. An enemy would be remiss if he failed to make the effort. The very submarines which would launch missiles toward the United States could do so from positions near Caribbean countries with today's relatively short range weapons. As the range of submarine launched missiles is increased, as it undoubtedly will be for all navies so equipped, this possibility can be extended to include positions near all Latin American countries. Even submarines of limited range could be used for the purpose of landing military personnel because they could be expected to base in the newly conquered country, or, if necessary, be abandoned after having served the primary purpose.

Enemy submarines based in Latin American countries would be in optimum position to block assistance to the United States. Non-availability of the resources of South America would cripple efforts in the United States to recover from the effects of a nuclear holocaust. Subversion of South American countries by a power hostile to the U.S. would eliminate them as sources of supply. If the attempt at control should not succeed or not be made in some countries,

submarines based in others would be able to prevent the unoccupied nations from aiding the United States. Doubtless Europe would suffer a severe assault at the same time that an all-out attack on the United States occurs, but even if these nations were able to furnish some material help to our country, Soviet submarines operating from Latin American ports, particularly those north of the equator, would be in a better position to oppose this effort than if they operated from Russian bases. The same reasoning applies to thwarting aid from Africa and probably Australia and the South Pacific as well.⁶

Preoccupation with the Communist threat has diverted attention from the possibility and the consequences of military threats by non-nuclear powers. None is on the horizon now, but the possibility can never be completely eliminated. It should not be encouraged by a position of such weakness as to preclude adequate defense. In World War II, more than 100,000 U.S. troops had to be diverted to Latin America to protect against a possible invasion because the Latin American armed forces could not be brought up to the strength required for effective opposition until at least three years after the threat had been recognized and the decision to furnish arms had been made.⁷

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6. The limiting factor for submarine patrols against merchant ships normally is expenditure of torpedoes. These could be shipped to Soviet controlled Latin American ports by the time the submarines return from their first patrol.
 7. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1951, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1951, pp. 394-396.

Invasion of one Latin American republic by another is not only possible, but it has occurred or been attempted several times since the Mutual Security Act became operative for Latin America. The OAS has been very effective in handling these disturbances, at least in the small scale operations which have arisen, though on two occasions its action was requested but could not be used. However, the organization is not perfect, and it would be a serious mistake to conclude that its peaceful settlement procedures would be equally effective in conflicts between the larger and stronger states of Latin America.⁸ No one can be sure what kinds of government will follow those of the dictators, though the government which came to power in the Dominican Republic after General Trujillo's assassination gives indications of adhering to democratic ideals in its early days. The example of Cuba under Castro demonstrates that democracies do not necessarily arise under these conditions, and the difficulty experienced at the meeting of foreign ministers of the OAS in Uruguay in January 1962 in reaching agreement on how to deal with a Cuban government which threatens hemispheric security, indicates that the OAS cannot achieve a satisfactory solution under all circumstances.⁹

8. J. Lloyd Meacham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 406 and p. 422. Lieuwen considers the need for defensive assistance greatly reduced by the existence of the OAS. He cites its effectiveness in a 1955 conflict between Ecuador and Peru, which Meacham discusses as a case where the peace machinery was not utilized though action was taken under the Rio Treaty. Lieuwen treats this whole subject in a brief paragraph on pages 213 and 214.

9. The New York Times, February 1962, p. 3.

If the OAS cannot arrive at a means of halting the limited invasions and the subversion attempts by the Castro government through joint action, the individual nations must be prepared to counter such moves. Brigadier General W. A. Enemark, Director, Western Hemisphere Region, Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internal Security Affairs, has stated the view of the Kennedy administration:

...the announced intentions of the Castro regime to promote the overthrow of Latin American governments by indirect aggression, including deliberate use of subversion and guerilla warfare, is confronting countries in the hemisphere with a grave new threat to their security. Unless they develop the will, individually and jointly, to deal effectively with this new threat, they stand in danger of losing the opportunity for orderly economic and social growth within a framework of free institutions.

The repeated public statements of leaders of the Castro regime leave no room for doubt that they plan to employ the insidious strategy of indirect aggression in all its forms to replace constitutional governments with totalitarian regimes patterned on the Castro model. For all of the American Republics, this constitutes an imminent and serious threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

The insidious character of this type of warfare has created for Latin American armed forces critical new requirements for military training and equipment. They are turning to us for help in developing the special type of capabilities required to seek out, destroy, or take into custody arms and bands of armed men which move clandestinely across their land, sea and air borders for subversive purposes; to deal effectively with disorders in the cities; and to prevent or control guerrilla outbreaks in rural areas.¹⁰

The nature of the threat and the flexibility needed to meet it successfully as it arises in several countries were cited by General Enemark as necessitating removal of the ceiling on

10. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on International Development and Security, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1961, Part 2, pp. 775-776.

expenditures for military aid for Latin America.

The United States as Sole Defender

The Rio treaty binds the American Republics to collective defense of the hemisphere against aggression. There can be no doubt that only the United States is capable of performing many of the tasks which might be entailed in this defense. However, this is not sufficient reason to relieve the other countries in the hemisphere of responsibility for common defense. An attack against the United States with nuclear armed missiles would leave its conventional forces decimated, their mobility disrupted. Latin America might then have to assume the burden of self-defense. Another consideration is the desire of Latin Americans to furnish, or at least participate in, their own defense. The sensitiveness of Brazil to this issue in World War II, discussed above, is an example.

Even if it were possible from a political point of view to have the United States provide for all the defense needs of the hemisphere, there is some doubt that this is the best method. General Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff stated at a Congressional hearing:

I look upon military assistance to our allies as adding strength and depth to the military posture of the United States. It enables our allies to organize, train and equip units which enhance the capability of the free world to meet the challenge of Communist aggression and subversion. No amount of money spent on our forces could give the United States a comparable asset of trained, well-equipped forces, familiar with the

terrain and in a suitable position for immediate resistance to local aggression. /Italics mine./¹¹

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is an important part of hemispheric defense. The world has long known of Russia's numerical strength in submarines. Now Soviet submarines with missile launching capabilities have been observed. Anti-submarine patrols are difficult and arduous, and the ships which are employed for patrols are of limited endurance. The forces engaged in ASW work must have adequate support from bases near the patrol area. Even if the ASW forces of the United States were not already stretched very thin and were not forced to use ships that are approaching the end of their useful lives, the problem of bases would make it most desirable that Latin American countries assist with the ASW effort.

The need of some countries for submarines has been questioned, particularly Peru, which had four expensive submarines built to her specifications by a private shipyard in the United States in 1954 and 1957. Whatever the motive for such acquisitions, these ships can be put to good use in anti-submarine warfare. Developments in the United States in the last few years have resulted in marked advances in the use of submarines as submarine killers. Adapting the U.S. methods and equipment to the submarines of Latin American navies is no more difficult than equipping and training their

11. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on International Development and Security, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1961, Part 2, p. 601.

surface ASW forces. Besides, training ASW forces is best accomplished through the use of submarines which are always available.

A similar line of reasoning can be applied to the recent acquisition of aircraft carriers by Brazil and Argentina. Aircraft carriers are versatile and can be employed in many operations in addition to anti-submarine warfare. There are, of course, conventional uses of projecting air power in a given combat area. A more recent development, and one which seems especially applicable to Latin America, is the vertical envelopment concept of the U.S. Marine Corps. This technique involves the use of helicopters from carriers for ship-to-shore movement of troops. In an area where mobility on land is limited and extensive areas are relatively remote from centers of control, this procedure permits the use of rather small forces to insure internal security.

The U.S. armed forces cannot spread themselves too thin. The Navy has made some show of strength in times of incipient disorder, as it did in the case of the Dominican Republic in November 1961.¹² However, there are limits as to what may be done and how effective the action may be. Even more important is the reception which such procedures have in a Latin America which is unusually sensitive to intervention. If more than a single country were involved, or if the disorder were widespread within a country, it

12. The New York Times, November 20, 1961, p. 1.

would be most difficult, if not impossible, to furnish adequate military strength in sufficient time, even if such assistance were requested promptly. In any event, this could only be done with reasonable assurance, in the absence of Latin American forces, through a much larger expenditure by the United States than it now makes for defense forces for the hemisphere and, of course, a larger proportion of manpower in its armed forces than is now required.

The Threat from Within

Successful subversion of a government in Latin America is a matter of serious concern to all the American republics if it results in control of a country by a group whose ideology and actions are inimical to the continued well being of the other nations. While the possibility is not confined to Communist activity, this has been the most active and most worrisome one in recent years. There are several individual countries in Latin America which are attractive targets for Communist domination. Panama is an obvious one, not so much for its wartime importance, which has diminished, as for the possibilities it presents for disrupting peace-time trade and for political embarrassment of the United States. Venezuela, with her oil, is another. A Communist Mexico would be an undesirable neighbor for the United States. Actually, a Communist government anywhere in Latin America is troublesome, and United States response to the fact or threat of such a government may be seen in its actions and relations with Cuba in 1961 and 1962 and with Guatemala in 1954.

The size of the Communist party in a given country is not necessarily a true indication of Communist strength or potential there. Latin American nations have been dominated by a very small percentage of the public throughout their history. This percentage has slowly increased from about one percent in colonial times to about ten percent in the 1960's.¹³ A large part of the influential group consists of the intellectuals, who are often left-leaning and might be the more readily influenced by a strong Communist campaign for a specific goal. Trade unions are also susceptible to such a move. The appropriation of a revolutionary movement by Communists and the way in which this can be done was demonstrated by the Castro regime in Cuba. Such success as the Communists have had in Latin America since World War II has been due largely to their ability to exploit the political, social, and economic revolution which pervades all of Latin America.¹⁴

It is sometimes argued that internal threats are a police matter and that there is no need for an army to deal with internal security matters.¹⁵ This seems to be too

13. John J. Johnson, lecture on 5 January 1962.

14. Mecham, p. 425.

15. Lieuwen, p. 213. He states that, while Communist capacities for subversion through penetration, propaganda, and influence in such organizations as trade unions do represent a serious threat in some countries, this is not a military problem, that in most countries the task of preserving internal order against Communist subversion is well handled by the police, and that in any event the armed forces were capable of maintaining internal order before they began to get aid from the United States.

narrow a view and one which is at variance with the facts of life, not only in Latin America, but in advanced countries such as the United States. Sometimes disturbances are of such magnitude, or there is such divergence between national and local interests, that police work can only be performed adequately by army units. The use of federal troops to cope with racial disturbances in Little Rock, Arkansas, and the frequent use of the National Guard by the various states in times of strike violence, or when floods may bring looting or disorder, are examples of conditions in the United States which require that troops perform police functions. The Latin American nations experience conditions in which disorder and violence erupt more frequently, yet these countries also have very extensive areas which are not under the effective control of any civil law enforcement agencies. In some republics, a major part of its total area is almost unoccupied, as in the Amazonian sections of Ecuador and Peru, or the Guiana highlands of Venezuela. In fact, this last republic demonstrates well the need for troops to cope with civic strife. Violence broke out coincident with the 1962 Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS to consider chastizing Cuba. The President of Venezuela called out Army patrols after a bomb blew a hole in the wall of the United States Embassy. Continued violence resulted in calling out marine and parachute units to reinforce troops in Caracas, the capital.¹⁶

16. The New York Times, January 24, 1962, p. 10.

The police are never as good as the armed forces in caliber of personnel, discipline, or training. Nor are they organized in such a way as to be effective beyond a restricted locality. Therefore, they are more limited in their capability to counter subversion on a large scale and in many places at the same time. The armed forces are frequently called upon to cope with disturbances which have gone beyond the point where the police can handle them. This is usually a distasteful situation for the armed forces when it results from strikes or protests over domestic issues, but the military forces would be more than willing to act where the nation or its institutions are jeopardized.

Events in British Guiana in February 1962 illustrate the need for armed forces and their role in preserving internal order. A similar need and role would apply to counter-subversive activity. The country is a British colony, but it has full internal self-government, including responsibility for internal security, and Prime Minister Jagan has been pressing for complete independence by August 1962. A general strike arose in opposition to the Prime Minister's budget and constitutional proposals. The government of British Guiana was forced to appeal to the British governor for British troops when the 1500 man constabulary was unable to control mobs which embarked on a rampage of looting and arson. Racial enmity between negro and East Indian inhabitants was a big factor in the violence. One-third of the capital's business district was destroyed, and losses are equivalent

to one-sixth of the annual production of the country.

British troops numbering less than 600 restored order rather easily, even though they arrived after the rioting had become severe. Prime Minister Jagan has indicated that he will form a national army to deal with the possibility of future outbursts against the government. Unfortunately, in this case, the national army is apt to be used for political purposes.¹⁷ Though British Guiana is a non-Latin country of the hemisphere, its problems in this incident were not significantly different from those which might arise in the neighboring Latin countries.

Anarchy in a country is itself a threat to hemispheric security, whether or not it is exploited by Communists acting to further the movement's international goals. It often brings into power a government which is repugnant to the rest of the hemisphere, as was that of Rojas Pinilla in Colombia (1953-1957). In addition it retards the growth of the country, as continuous civil strife in the years from 1946 to 1958 did in Colombia, through waste of lives, funds, and economic opportunities.¹⁸ Civil police cannot be expected to bring order when army efforts in several years under martial law have not been able to do so.¹⁹

17. The New York Times, February 17, 1962, p. 1; February 20, 1962, p. 13; February 21, 1962, p. 5; February 23, 1962, p. 8.

18. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America From the Beginning to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 518-522.

19. The New York Times, July 3, 1961, p. 3, reported five departments of central Colombia under a state of siege. The issue of 13 October 1961, p. 34, reported the decree

In countries which have no army, internal security is often maintained by a national police force. The difference between a national police force and an army is not a sharp one. Costa Rica's Constitution of 1848 abolished the army and substituted a civil guard, but the U.S. has an army mission there in 1962. In Panama, the chief of police, Jose Antonio Remon, was the actual ruling power at least from 1949 until his assassination in 1955. In the countries which the United States Marine Corps occupied in the early 1900's, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, it was energetic officers of the Marine Corps--trained constabularies who exercised power as soon as U.S. occupation ended.²⁰

The need for armed forces and the strength required are matters which cannot be determined with precision. If a country errs in this respect, it will probably be on the safe side. The defense forces maintained may be somewhat larger than seem warranted by existing conditions, but the strength level may reflect recognition of the lead time required to build up armed forces, and the military establishments may fulfill other needs, either actual or intangible.

of a state of emergency, a modified form of martial law, after an attempted revolt involving army personnel.

20. Herring, pp. 433, 441, 466, 469, 475-476.

CHAPTER IV

U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA

U.S. military programs in Latin America are not simply examples of largesse. The success of these activities in preparing Latin American armed forces for effective self-defense may be measured by the extent to which they relieve the United States of the need to provide manpower for this purpose. There are other benefits, or at least potential benefits, which accrue to the United States from its Mutual Security Program. There are potential hazards too, but mistakes of the past, few of which escaped notice and comment, appear to be providing effective guideposts for the present and future. The United States has modified its military programs, not merely by eliminating certain objectionable policies, but rather through changes in basic military thinking.

Changes in U.S. Military Thought

A major, recent change in U.S. military thought has placed increased emphasis on conventional and guerrilla forces. The influence of General Maxwell Taylor, long an advocate of this change, in his present position as advisor to President Kennedy, fosters revision of U.S. military programs along this line. An early example was delivery of anti-subversion equipment to Bolivia for use in the June

1961 rioting.¹ A report on the U.S. Army Caribbean School at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone indicates that the school, which has graduated more than 10,000 members of Latin American armed forces in twelve years of operation, added a new and comprehensive course in counter-resistance operations in August 1961. The course is based on a curriculum developed for the U.S. Army's Special Forces and has been expanded to fit the problems of Latin America. Its work is doubly important because half the class members, at least in the earlier classes, will teach similar courses in their own countries.² The training may not be an unmixed blessing, however. A rebel group in Guatemala, which began operations in February 1962, was led by officers who had graduated from the school at Fort Gulick, though it appears that they completed their training before the newest course was started.³

The U.S. Army has maintained Special Forces, trained in guerrilla warfare, for some time, but the increased emphasis on this type of activity is indicated by the appointment, in January 1962, of the Army's youngest general to a new post as special assistant to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, with the rank of major general, to direct the Army's efforts in guerrilla warfare. The general's responsibilities include "para-military operations, psychological and unconventional warfare, and the employment of irregular forces."⁴

1. The New York Times, July 12, 1961, p. 3.

2. The New York Times, August 27, 1961, p. 29.

3. The New York Times, February 16, 1962, p. 7.

4. The New York Times, January 25, 1962, p. 16.

The forces he will command have been expanding; the proposed Department of Defense appropriations for 1962 provided for more than doubling the special forces by adding 3000 spaces.⁵

Military Aspects of the Programs

If the United States government has become convinced that it is necessary to expand its own conventional forces and guerrilla forces, previous arguments for reduction of the conventional forces of Latin America have lost some of their validity, particularly if these forces are modified and trained to cope with guerrilla activity. In fact, it is with forces of this type that Latin America can make its major contribution to common defense, the need for which was discussed in Chapter III. In doing so, Latin America can relieve the United States of the need to build up its own forces still more. Secretary of the Army Stahr expressed the need for joint action by the U.S. and Latin America (among others) in this statement:

Of particular importance now, and in my opinion, most likely of increasing importance in the years ahead, is the task the Army is doing to improve substantially its capabilities, as well as those of selected countries, to meet challenges presented in the form of subversion, insurgency, and guerrilla actions. This is primarily an Army job.

By strengthening our Special Forces this type of challenge can be countered with increased effectiveness. The numbers of allied indigenous forces, particularly in peripheral areas, trained to combat insurgency, subversion, and guerrilla actions can be increased measurably. In addition, critically important training

5. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 32.

of these forces in such fields as counterintelligence and civil affairs, which are essential to complete success in such type operations, can be stepped up.

Moreover, the indigenous Special Forces can be formed in friendly countries. I am greatly impressed with the imagination, energy, and realistic planning and training which are going into this Special Forces effort.⁶

Secretary of Defense McNamara stated that a detachment of two officers and ten enlisted men of the Special Forces can organize and train 1500 indigenous personnel in the conduct of guerrilla or anti-guerrilla operations.⁷ This would apply primarily to situations such as that in Viet-Nam, but it indicates what may be done in Latin America as well.

Not all of the equipment and training assistance being furnished to Latin America is up-to-date, however. The criticism is sometimes made that the armies are equipped with "yesterday's weapons, hand-me-downs from the world's first-rank military powers."⁸ Still, the older weapons may be quite appropriate to the conditions under which they will be used. A troop of horsemen may be more effective than a tank battalion in controlling an unruly mob. Much depends on the equipment of opposing forces, and subversive groups may well have difficulty in procuring arms which can effectively counter even obsolescent weapons in the hands of the national armies. Many of the most modern weapons require logistic support of a nature which cannot be achieved in Latin America at present, and the lack of a well developed transportation

6. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 64.

7. Senate, Hearings, Defense Appropriation, p. 32.

8. Lieuwen, p. 211.

network would reduce the effectiveness of many military equipments or make them inappropriate to the areas of intended use.

Even an elite anti-guerrilla force would have to draw its members from a larger army which had been trained with relatively unsophisticated equipment. And that army, in order to incorporate more advanced equipment, would have to master less complicated arms and vehicles first. The status of Latin American armed forces during World War II and the Korean War indicate that they can use older equipment to advantage for training purposes and for meeting the limited opposition they might expect to find, under conditions which do not especially favor the most modern arms. Of course, weapons must be replaced with newer equipment whenever spare parts and ammunition cease to be available.

Replacement of arms for which the supply of parts and ammunition is uncertain is one of the major goals of the Mutual Security Program as it applies to Latin America. As a general aim, weapons standardization, using U.S. arms, has been adopted by all Latin American countries through the approved program of the Inter-American Defense Board, which has members from each American republic. However, grants are made to only ten countries which have bilateral treaties with the U.S., and some purchases of military equipment from European sources have occurred.⁹ Standardization is a logical

9. Lieuwen, p. 197.

military aim, based on the desire to eliminate supply problems such as those which arose at the start of World War II.¹⁰ In addition, the program does provide for some over-all economies in the hemispheric defense system by permitting continued use of equipment which is obsolescent for major combat actions but far from worn out or unusable for less demanding conditions. The program is concerned with major weapons—some of the Latin American countries have equipped themselves with small arms of their own or foreign design and manufacture.

The standardization program is one indication that the U.S. military assistance efforts in Latin America profited from World War II experiences and in many ways continue the precedents of the lend lease programs established at that time. The current program is not militaristic. It is carried on with the active support of the State Department, as may be seen by the appearance and statements of several officers of that department, including the Secretary of State, at annual Congressional hearings on the Mutual Security Act. The Latin American countries are allocated only a small proportion of the total amount disbursed under the provisions

10. Lieuwen states on p. 222 that he considers standardization primarily a political tool, a means of keeping out Soviet missions by keeping out Soviet weapons. However, there are other ways of keeping the Soviet influence out of Latin America, and the use of a standardization program for this purpose is at best secondary. Standardization is intended to exclude arms from European sources as well as Communist sources, because of the supply difficulties engendered.

of the Act. This amount does not, and is not expected to, underwrite more than a small fraction of the cost of the Latin American armed forces, nor does it determine their total strength. The emphasis is not on small arms nor on offensive armaments but on equipment which contributes directly to hemispheric defense through ASW operations and the maintenance of internal stability. Because the contributions which the various countries can make to hemispheric security differ, the amount of aid tendered to each differs also.

The military missions which are an integral part of the U.S. military assistance effort are useful in ways other than training for common defense. They permit the U.S. government to be continually aware of the military situation within the countries of Latin America, supplementing the observations of the attachés. To some extent this applies also to political and social trends. Knowledge of this widespread awareness by the U.S. reduces suspicion and mistrust among the Latin American nations, because they realize that it is no longer possible for the actions of their hemispheric neighbors to be carried on in complete secrecy.¹¹ These countries also have some knowledge of U.S. military thinking and planning through contact with U.S. military missions. More is involved here than overt intelligence collection. Day-to-day collaboration in training, planning, and administration should give greater insight into the

11. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. (ed.), American Military Policy (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1957), p. 242.

motivation of Latin American movements and of the nationals who participate in them.

Surely the United States military leaders are not so omniscient that there can be no contribution in military tactics, technique, or thought by the members of the Latin American armed forces, especially insofar as local conditions are concerned. This too might logically occur in the course of the normal operations of missions. There are other opportunities as well. Joint exercises have been conducted with Latin American forces, and these are frequently productive of new ideas. Formal schooling has also been a continuing feature of U.S. military assistance to Latin America. It is conducted for almost all levels of rank and professional skill.¹² The courses at the War Colleges and at the Command and Staff College may be the most important from a purely military point of view. It is at schools on this level where the exchange of ideas is most apt to result in significant contributions by Latin American officers to the common store of military knowledge.

Integration with Political Goals and Economic Aid

Collaboration in military matters certainly would be expected to result in a climate favorable to the attainment of U.S. political objectives in Latin America. Among these

12. The author has had classmates from Latin American countries at the U.S. Naval Academy, U.S.N. Submarine School, New London, and U.S. Fleet Sonar School, Key West.

aims are promotion of internal stability, exclusion of Soviet influence, preservation of the OAS, access to bases when they are needed, access to strategic materials, and prevention of international disputes.¹³ While these objectives might be achieved if there were no military assistance program, the military efforts must support, not hamper, the attainment of the desired political ends. Actually, military aid is quite effective, by itself and in conjunction with economic aid, in realizing objectives which are not strictly military.

Lucien W. Pye sees the relationship between military and economic aid in these terms:

In seeking a realistic estimate of the potential role of the military in the political development of particular countries it is also necessary to avoid being excessively influenced by ideological considerations which may be relevant only in advanced societies. We have in mind, in particular, the Western stereotype of the military as a foe of liberal values. This bias, for example, tends at present to take the form of seeing 'military aid' as a threat to economic and political development and of assuming that only 'economic aid' can make a positive contribution to such form of development. In some cases 'military aid'

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13. Lieuwen, pp. 218-225. Mr. Lieuwen considers political cooperation to achieve these goals as the primary objective of U.S. military programs in Latin America. The relative position of the political factor is dependent on whether or not one believes that Latin America has an established military role in hemispheric defense. Determination of the primacy of the political or military considerations is material insofar as justification for the amount and kind of military assistance rendered is concerned, not the validity of the political goals. The U.S. is now less willing to give military equipment to a country simply because it may be politic to accede to requests by Latin American governments. Venezuela negotiated for some time to get a submarine for training. Agreement was reached only after Venezuela committed itself to allow Colombia to share in the services of the submarine, according to LCDR Ortega,

has in fact made substantial contributions to road building, health facilities, communications networks and the like, all of which have directly facilitated economic growth. In other cases it has been equally clear that our military aid has seriously retarded economic development by diverting an excessive amount of the nation's energies into unproductive channels. ...it is possible, and indeed it is essential, to expand a narrow relationship with the military into a much broader one. Military aid has had to become economic aid.

Mr. Pye believes that military and economic aid efforts are sometimes overly concerned with administrative functions and need closer contact with the politicians of the recipient country. His remarks refer primarily to the emerging nations of Africa and Asia, but they are pertinent also to Latin America.¹⁴

While military and economic aid can and should be complementary, they need not be competitive in terms of available funds. Since military aid to Latin America can reduce the manpower requirements of the U.S. armed forces, this assistance can be considered as competing for resources with the domestic military programs of the U.S. rather than with foreign economic aid.¹⁵ There is no clear-cut

Venezuelan Navy, in an interview on 7 March 1962.

14. Lucien W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Stanford University, unpublished manuscript, 1961), pp. 159-161.
15. Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, "The Purposes of United States Military and Economic Assistance," Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Vol. II, Annex A, p. 28. The report is known as the Draper Report. The Committee did not necessarily agree with nor adopt the contents of the studies included as annexes in the supplement.

distinction in the effects of aid on the budgets of the recipients, since any aid, whether of dollars or of material, permits the receiving government to divert to some other use funds of its own, which had been earmarked for the same purpose. Receipt of military equipment, for instance, allows a government to increase non-military segments of its budget by the amount it had planned to spend for arms.¹⁶ While the military budgets of Latin America are often high in terms of percentage of the total government expenditure, the sum is actually quite small, often less than that spent by a major U.S. city for its fire and police protection. In any event, only a small part of the military budget in Latin American countries uses up foreign exchange. The remainder is returned to the local economy in wages and for purchases of food, clothing, etc. Thus, even though no production is involved in expenditures for the armed forces, no serious problem arises in connection with the military budget.¹⁷ In relation to gross national product, the Latin American military budgets are next to the lowest in the world, at 2.9%. In return, the countries benefit from civic betterment of military trainees.¹⁸

Military personnel acquire skills that are useful to their countries. To improve these skills is not a primary function of U.S. military assistance to Latin America, nor

16. Arnold Wolfers, "Questions of Priority in Mutual Security Allocation," Draper Report, Annex B., p. 37.

17. John J. Johnson, lecture on February 20, 1962.

18. Mecham, p. 340.

can it be as the programs are now constituted. As a secondary effect, however, military training which contributes to the capability of the Latin American armed forces to further economic and social progress is very important. Most of these capabilities are of an engineering or communications nature, and many are best exercised by individuals rather than by organized military units, so expansion of U.S. military effort in this area does not seem to be warranted now. If the Latin American republics themselves expand the civic undertakings performed by their military agencies, then the U.S. would do well to expand this facet of military training, particularly if integration of all U.S. agencies engaged in furnishing aid is continued. Military equipment which may be applied to non-military use in such programs is now being supplied to Latin America, and the supply of this type of equipment could be increased without difficulty.

Latin America presents some special problems in connection with aid programs. John P. Gillen indicates the sort of rapport which, if established, will be conducive to the success of a given program.

Traditionally, for the middle-status individual, only those with whom he feels an intimate, personal relationship are trustworthy. Personal friendship, plus a kinship relationship of some kind, is essential for 'getting something done.' ... Similarly, any 'program,' such as Point Four, requires the 'personal touch' if it is to succeed. North American administrators and experts, regardless of their personal competence, will have little success in their dealings with the middle segments unless they are able to develop personal confidence and evoke simpatia.¹⁹

19. John P. Gillen, "Some Signposts for Policy," Social Change in Latin America Today, Its Implications for United States

The similarities of education, experience, and aims of military men should make the establishment of the necessary relationship easier and more complete than is possible for civilian experts.

The practice of having Latin American military personnel attend schools in the U.S. helps to foster the development of simpatia. Perhaps an even more important effect is that of permitting these officers and men to see the U.S. at first hand. A respect for the political institutions of the U.S. may well result from such acquaintance. Furthermore, an appreciation of U.S. technology gained from a tour at school may have important repercussions in Latin American countries.

If the rapport between military personnel of the United States and of Latin America can be intensified, its influence may extend to other portions of the U.S. aid effort. The Alliance for Progress has fostered more coordination of the agencies involved in aid to Latin America. To some extent, as military personnel act in closer conjunction with other agencies, the rapport established may be transferred to the civilian groups. This is particularly true in countries where military officers play leading roles in industry and public service.

In some countries, the military is the only group with national interests and a unifying influence. Under

these conditions a close relationship with U.S. military personnel does serve political purposes, particularly in terms of stability and exclusion of Communist influence. There is some danger that too close a tie to such a group may have an adverse effect if the group's influence is diminished or if an opposition group supersedes it. Past errors of uncritical support of military dictatorships, highlighted by the presentation of personal decorations to the dictator by high U.S. government officials, have been widely publicized. The difficulties experienced by Vice President Nixon on his 1958 trip to Latin America, and the protocol for dealing with authoritarian governments which he evolved as a result, have made a lasting impression in the United States, and there seems to be little doubt that the U.S. government will be circumspect in its dealings with Latin American countries.

In being circumspect, the U.S. government may elect to place little emphasis on the political effects of U.S. military assistance. Some critics feel that the military programs even now are working counter to U.S. foreign policy interests in Latin America. If this was in fact true of military assistance in the 1950's it is less true now. Changing conditions in the hemisphere, changes in military thought, and changes in the administration of the several concurrent aid programs have acted to make U.S. military assistance to Latin America more important than ever. The promotion of stability and the secondary effects of

technological and economic development are important to the growth of prosperity and modernity in the nations of Latin America. In helping to bring about these things, military programs support the aims of U.S. foreign policy.

CHAPTER V

THE DOMESTIC ROLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ARMED FORCES

The military establishments of Latin America are influential in many sectors of national life, including politics, as they are in underdeveloped countries generally. Their influence may not invariably be beneficial, but usually it contributes in some measure to the best interests of their countries. The significant points are that military influence increasingly is exercised with moderation, that it is used to protect widely accepted values from extremist action rather than to preserve intact the status quo, that it is effective in situations which do not lend themselves to civilian effort, and that these considerations indicate a maturation of the armed forces which the Latin American republics have sought. In view of the pervasive nature of their influence at the present time, it is unlikely that the armed forces of Latin America will permit much diminution of their strength or role except by an evolutionary process. In addition, the republics of Latin America have a fairly sizable capital investment in military equipment which they probably will maintain for some time. If the armed forces are going to retain their present status, it would seem that the optimum course would be to utilize these forces in every practicable way which contributes to the over-all growth of

the countries maintaining them.

Origin and Development

Latin America had no need for large military establishments before the wars for independence in the early 1800's. Indian populations numbering thousands had been conquered by Spanish conquistadores with only a few score armed men in each area of subjugation. An even smaller number sufficed to keep the Indians under control, since they had been accustomed to domination by their own rulers, and the major use of army units in the colonial period was to garrison the coastal and frontier areas. Preservation of order was not possible outside the limits of the cities and towns, but none was necessary because the Spanish population pattern was such that all important functions were concentrated in a very few cities, a condition which persists in modern times in Latin America. Since the total forces needed in the New World were very small, the Spanish king could and did provide them by sending troops from Spain for a tour of duty in America, after which they might return to Europe.

Few of the creoles, persons of pure Spanish blood born in America, had any part in the armed forces in the colonies for the first two and a half centuries. In the 1760's colonial militia, officered by creoles, was organized. The commissions were sought for the prestige attached to them however, rather than because of interest in a military career.¹ The number of these officers was small, and the

1. Lyle N. McAllister, The "Fuero Militar" in New Spain 1764-1800 (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1957),

extent of their ability was generally even smaller. They were not the leaders in the independence movement, though some were in subordinate positions, and many remained with the royalist forces. All who had been in authority during the wars, whether gifted amateurs or those with experience in the militia, continued to hold and to use power in the post-war years, however.

The wars lasted so long that men who had spent all their adult years participating in the fifteen years of violence were the ones who were in a position of authority in the new countries formed from the old Spanish Empire. The governments which were established by the end of this period were authoritarian ones in which centralized power was controlled by a strong military leader who headed a personal retinue. Local bosses, supported by similar personal followers, might control autonomous regions within the country. Even the hacendados, the owners of large estates, maintained private armies, or raised them when necessary to preserve their control in an area. The power struggle progressively narrowed down the number of small armies as one would gain dominance over others in a given region.²

pp. 2-5. There had been some separate companies of infantry and cavalry, but these were not organized and often existed in name only.

2. Charles E. Chapman, "The Age of Caudillos: A Chapter in Hispanic American History," The Evolution of Latin American Government, ed. Asher N. Christensen (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), pp. 65-81.

By the end of the nineteenth century national armies had supplanted the lesser groups, and it was no longer possible for private armies to wrest control from the national forces. Henceforth, successful revolutions had to have at least partial support of the national armed forces.³ Thus they exercised a predominant influence in the political fortunes of their nations, though revolutions occurred less frequently.

The position of supremacy attained by national forces did not mean much in terms of professional capability. Military missions from several western countries have been called upon to help increase the professional competence of Latin American armed forces in the twentieth century. Since the beginning of World War II this has been the exclusive preserve of military missions from the United States, and there is no indication that their status will change from the 1962 position, in which U.S. assistance is given to almost all of the Latin American republics.

Progress in modernizing Latin American armed forces has been slow. Though a considerable effort to this end had been made by foreign military missions before World War II, the condition of the armies they had helped to train was not sufficiently good to permit them to defend their own countries against Axis forces. The U.S. Department of State described the Chilean Army as being in "deplorable" circumstances. The War Department made a "combat estimate" of the

3. Lieuwen, p. 30.

Mexican military establishment which concluded that the Mexican Army was adequate for maintaining internal security but not for waging a war against a strong opponent, because of shortages of equipment and lack of training as a team in the techniques of modern warfare. The Mexican Navy consisted of a few coastal patrol boats and had become a separate service only on 1 January 1940. The state of Brazil's forces has been described earlier. In sum, the United States analysts believed that Latin American nations could do no more than provide for their own internal security and fend off attacks until U.S. forces could arrive, that to do this much it was necessary for the U.S. to furnish arms to these nations, and that the principal defense against assault would have to be provided by United States forces.⁴ Considerations in 1962 are much the same, though Latin American armed forces have greatly increased their capabilities. Military techniques and equipments throughout the world have become more sophisticated, and the forces of Latin America must continue to improve their arms and skill in order to maintain their relative position or, if possible, better it.

The current capabilities of Latin American armed forces can only be estimated. Specific information concerning them is classified. General statements of an official nature normally avoid any disparaging connotation and therefore give only a partial evaluation at best. However, an indication of the increasing ability of the armed forces in the hemisphere

4. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 211, 352, 214.

is seen in the types of ships and aircraft which they have acquired and operated over the past few years. Most Latin American navies are operating vessels built by the United States for World War II use, which require considerable talent and training to operate. This applies not just to their engineering plants but to rather complicated electronic equipment and weapons. Modern jet aircraft are not uncommon among Latin American air forces.

Development relates to changes in the composition of the armed forces as well as to professional skill with modern arms. The armies are being modified so that there are fewer infantry units and artillery batteries and more engineer battalions. This change is in recognition of the facts that Latin American armies are not apt to be called upon so much to fight on the traditional battlefield as to counter guerrillas, that technical units which can perform development tasks in peace time are more valuable today than strictly combat forces, and that improving communications will increase the effectiveness of the armed forces. The navies are becoming more concerned with coast guard functions, and are emphasizing destroyers for ASW operations. The smaller craft, which were formerly assigned to ASW patrol duties, are now more likely to be used in anti-contraband patrols. Air forces tend to operate fewer, but more modern, fighter planes while increasing the operation of planes suitable for troop lift and cargo carrying.⁵

5. Interview with Lieutenant Commander Oscar Ortega Jugo, Venezuelan Navy, 7 March 1962. It is recognized that his

Some advantages of continuing the development and modernizing of the Latin American armed forces may be seen from an incident involving Costa Rica in 1955. A revolutionary group operating from Nicaragua bombed and strafed several towns as part of an attempted invasion of Costa Rica. Since the Costa Rican government had no combat aircraft, it had to make an immediate appeal for assistance. Within four days the U.S. furnished four P-51 fighter aircraft to Costa Rica (the U.S. had waited for approval by the Council of the OAS), and these planes were able to bring about the surrender of the three plane force of the revolutionaries to Nicaraguan authorities.⁶ Costa Rica still has no military aircraft, and she was able to get help without much delay, but the planes did play an important role in the action. The role may be decisive, and immediate availability of aircraft may be vital, as the part played by Castro's planes in breaking up the abortive invasion of Cuba by counter-revolutionaries in 1961 indicated.

National Military Functions

The need for Latin American armed forces to cope with threats from within and without, whether Communist inspired or not, has already been discussed in sufficient detail. In addition to the actual performance which may be anticipated

remarks do not have identical application to all Latin American countries, but they do indicate a trend, especially when considered in conjunction with the activity of U.S. Army School, Fort Gulick, and other indications.
6. Mechem, p. 404.

of the armed forces, however, they are of value as a force in being. Weak states invite attack, and maintenance of reasonable military strength lessens a possible cause of strife, though the work of the Organization of American States also reduces conflicts. The insecurity of nations which are militarily weak is incompatible with their economic development, and that of regional arrangements such as common markets as well.⁷ A nation without military strength is narrowly circumscribed in its domestic and foreign policies. Samuel P. Huntington puts it more strongly when he says that military policy is both domestic policy and foreign policy—that military policy is the product of the influences of the domestic and external environments of the government and of the goals it pursues in those environments.⁸

Important internal military functions are intelligence and counter-intelligence. The weeding out of subversive personnel within the Latin American armed forces is not a big consideration at this time, it seems, but the capability to handle this potential problem must be kept current. This sort of effort is also required as a supplement to police surveillance of civilian personnel, especially in countries which have extensive portions of the country that are very

7. Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, Draper Report, Annex C, p. 50. The basic ideas of succeeding paragraphs are also touched upon in this source.

8. Samuel P. Huntington, "Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in American Military Policy," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI (December 1961), p. 482.

sparsely settled. Intelligence data concerning these isolated areas is also needed.

Prestige resulting from military strength is a factor to be reckoned with in Latin America. This was probably an important consideration among those which impelled Brazil to buy an aircraft carrier from Great Britain when she could not obtain one from the United States. This action doubtless has had important implications on the military assistance program for Brazil because it is a departure from the standardization program and because of the heavy expenditure of foreign exchange which was involved. Still, Argentina was negotiating for an aircraft carrier at the same time in 1956, and the two countries, which have long had naval parity, are contending for leadership in Latin America. It is not surprising that Brazil should keep abreast of Argentina in modernizing its Navy, though the Navy was not prepared to integrate a carrier into the fleet.⁹ In this case the U.S. did not consider the military and prestige factors warranted making a carrier available to Brazil. A firm stand is often necessary in order to avoid an arms race or to discourage expenditures which the U.S. cannot justify to itself as being appropriate to its military assistance program. It is evident, however, that the prestige factor will have to be considered in conjunction with aid programs, and that enough flexibility must be incorporated into the programs to permit

9. The New York Times, December 2, 1956, p. 2; December 23, 1956, p. 12.

delivery of some items out of deference to the prestige aspirations of the recipients. In many instances, the maintenance of prestige is part of the over-all stability and power of a government.

The Armed Forces and Domestic Politics

The active part played by Latin American armed forces in domestic politics has been explored, and usually deplored, at some length by writers in both North and South America. For the purpose of this study, the important matter is that the recent actions of the armed forces indicate that they are becoming more moderate in the exercise of political influence. It was inevitable that control of government should be gained and held through force at the time that the republics were created, but as the Latin American countries matured, the armed forces became less precipitate and less direct in exerting influence on government. In times of anarchy they might impose a government on the country or limit an existing one, through force, as they have even in very recent years. This has occurred during periods of confusion such as were brought on by world depression in the 1930's, by dislocations in the post World War II era, and by breakdown of government where prolonged civil war has raged. Not all of the Latin American nations matured at the same rate, and those which are still ruled by dictators are those which have made the least progress since achieving independence. However, in most of the republics political pressure exerted by the armed forces has become relatively subtle.

Some caution must be exercised in drawing upon recent events, the story of which may be incomplete, to demonstrate changes in the amount and kind of political pressure which the armed forces may bring to bear. Yet the circumstances of the change of government in Brazil and Argentina are of such importance that even the fact that the armed forces refrained from certain types of conduct is revealing.

In Argentina, the events which led to the ouster of President Frondizi had their inception at least as early as two years ago, and the seeds of it were contained in the Peronist support which was a factor in Sr. Frondizi's election in 1958. A coup d'etat has impended throughout this entire period, but it is significant that the President and the leaders of the armed forces had always been able to reach acceptable compromises and that the single issue which could not be resolved, and which finally became intolerable, was the President's failure to give adequate attention to the preservation of the constitution from the threat of subversion by Peronist influences. The followers of Peron, far from being curbed, were given an opportunity to accede to positions of power within the government when the President authorized the Peronist party to present candidates for Congressional and gubernatorial seats in March 1962, for the first time since the party was outlawed in 1955. The Peronist show of strength in the elections was considered by the military leaders to constitute so grave a threat to the constitution, through the possibility of a return to totalitarian government, that the results must be annulled

and the President whose actions had brought about these results must be judged incapable of continued tenure of office.

The chief executive was deposed and arrested, but the sense of the matter was more nearly that of a motion of censure, similar to that which would bring about a change of government in several European democracies under their present constitutions. The President was unable to obtain sufficient support to form a coalition cabinet, so he could no longer continue to govern. While the military pressure was undoubtedly a decisive factor, President Frondizi could obtain no support from other political factions in making a cabinet. Instead, they were bitter in their personal attacks on him and his policies. Attempts to justify the ouster action as legal and to suppress the Peronist faction by legal means remain a source of trouble, continuing a crisis which is far from being settled at this writing. However, there has been no violence, and the argument that to allow the Peronistas to gain power would be to endanger the constitution and the government provided by it has some substance.¹⁰

Brazil's crisis occurred when the resignation of President Quadros in August 1961 meant that executive power would be assumed by Vice President Goulart, who was too Leftist in political leaning to suit the leaders of the

10. The New York Times, March 21, 1962, p. 1; March 23, 1962, p. 1; April 20, 1962, p. 1.

Brazilian armed forces. These leaders would not allow Sr. Goulart to assume the Presidency until his power could be limited by a constitutional amendment providing for a parliamentary form of government with a reduction in the power exercised by the President. There were troop movements which portended civil war, since there were divergent views among the military leaders themselves, many of whom wished to uphold the constitution unchanged. However, there were no actual clashes and Sr. Goulart did accept office as President under the revised constitution. On assuming office, the President replaced without incident the three military ministers who had opposed him. These ministers had acted in the firm belief that such action was necessary to preserve democracy in Brazil. They had been apprehensive concerning President Quadros' policy of closer relations with the Communist bloc, yet they had asked Dr. Quadros not to resign but to give them his reasons for wishing to do so in order that they might act rightfully within their means to improve conditions. President Quadros is quoted as having expressed his gratitude for the exemplary conduct shown by the armed forces in all circumstances.¹¹

John J. Johnson has noted that the armed forces of Latin America in general have progressed to the point where, if they intervene in government, they act in the name of the

11. The New York Times, September 1, 1961, p. 1; September 3, 1961, p. 1; September 9, 1961, p. 4; September 12, 1961, p. 14; September 22, 1961, p. 32—letter by former Brazilian ambassador to Britain.

armed forces themselves rather than at the behest of an individual. Instead of being subservient to a dictator, the military leaders form a junta in which they share executive power with civilian ministers in a government which is acknowledged to be temporary and which often provides for its own termination by legal means.¹² The military leaders of Argentina and Brazil seem to have gone one step beyond this point. They act in concert to press for moderation of certain practices of the Chief Executive by parliamentary maneuvering rather than by forcible means, and only take actions which affect the exercise of normal powers on the part of the President when they come to believe that his use of power will clearly endanger the constitution.

The influence of the United States military programs is not clearly demonstrated here. In fact, Argentina has been reluctant to participate in the hemispheric defense efforts fostered by the United States and has done so only to a limited extent. Neither can it be said that the actions of the armed forces were conditioned solely by their professional military stature. However, the two illustrations indicate that armed forces which are relatively advanced are also responsible and relatively restrained, and it is an implicit aim of the Mutual Security Act that the Latin American armed forces continue to progress with the help of the

12. John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society," The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Stanford, unpublished manuscript, 1961), p. 204.

United States.¹³

Other Extra-military Activity

In order to become modern, the armed forces of Latin America have had to change their goals, methods, and type of personnel from those of earlier times. The armed forces have supported technological progress and modern industry, and have been strong advocates of improved transportation and communication facilities, since the latter half of the nineteenth century. The military academies were founded at rather early dates in several of the Latin American countries, and they were oriented toward education in science. In modern times the armed forces have tended to identify themselves closely with industry. They don't like to be dependent on other countries for industrial products, so they encourage industrial development at home. The officers have

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13. Ecuador also had a serious crisis which resulted in the resignation of the President and the installation of the Vice President as Chief Executive. Rioting by civilian groups over tax increases, lack of action to rehabilitate the south, and the killing of rioting students brought about divided loyalties and fighting between military units over support of the President. The chiefs of staff are reported to have told President Velasco Ibarra that they could no longer defend his Presidency and to have obtained his promise to resign. Though the revolt was originally civilian in character, it was the Air Force which was decisive in supporting the Vice President, whom Congress voted to fill the vacant office, against the Army's choice, the President of the Supreme Court. (The New York Times, November 5, 1961, p. 42; November 8, 1961, p. 1; November 10, 1961, p. 1.) Ecuador has a history of tumult that has subsided only very slowly over the years since independence. In this instance, loss of life was low, order was restored without great difficulty, and the people backed the present incumbent against part of the Army. For Ecuador this might properly be considered progress.

skills that are rare in their countries, so they fill many top positions in industry.¹⁴ Military leaders are sensitive to the economic and technical development of their countries because this constitutes the basis for survival in rivalry with other nations.¹⁵

An educated and capable officer corps is only a starting point for a modern military force, however. The men they lead must acquire basic skills so that they can be trained to use the modern equipment with which they are armed and to provide the support services which a modern force must have. The extent to which this occurs may be seen from the evolution of United States forces. In 1954 only 28.8 per cent of U.S. Army enlisted personnel were engaged in purely military occupations as compared with 93.2 per cent at the time of the Civil War. The same pattern holds for the officer group and to an even greater extent for both the Navy and the Air Force. The civilian type occupations which U.S. military personnel now perform are those of technical, scientific, clerical, administrative, and service workers, skilled mechanics and operators, and laborers.¹⁶

In underdeveloped countries, making a good soldier means training a man in modern skills. In this effort, the armed forces are more thorough and more comprehensive than

14. Johnson, "The Latin American Military," pp. 208-209.

15. Pye, p. 147.

16. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 64-65.

are civilian agencies, since military discipline and training orders all the activities of those who are members. The focus is on skills, but literacy is itself an important fundamental skill. The modernizing process is a disruptive one, since the recruits are exposed to many influences for the first time, including such things as having adequate shoes and clothing as well as classroom experiences. Yet the armed forces provide a high degree of psychological security which permits these drastic changes to be accommodated more readily by the individual. Civilians who experience a similar uprooting, as by moving from the country to an urban slum, tend to become extremists in their search for security. People in the armed forces have at least some degree of social mobility and may advance on the basis of merit rather than of circumstances of birth. It is important too that the training in basic education and in citizenship are carried over to civilian life when the individuals complete their military service. The veterans are more apt to have political influence than they did before entering the service. Furthermore, they have a better realization of the responsibilities of nationalism, an appreciation of the sacrifices involved if political slogans are to be made effective.¹⁷

Teaching the military men to be literate need not involve much expenditure for classrooms and instructors. Work of this type is carried on by radio in many places in

17. Pye, pp. 150-156.

Latin America. In Colombia, the government has made arrangements so that the army men may follow the radio school, Accion Cultural Popular, which conducts a special school for the armed forces. In an organization which is about 60 per cent illiterate, this training is important.¹⁸ It could be given impetus in Colombia and elsewhere by making various degrees of literacy a requirement for advancement. The training could be continued after active service has been completed by the establishment of incentive through a paid military reserve. There are undoubtedly agencies that are better equipped than the armed forces to teach literacy skills, but the armed forces are probably in the best position to give men the time and purpose for participation in a literacy program.

Teaching men to read and write is a most valuable contribution to citizenship in itself, but in addition it opens up many avenues for civic advancement of the individuals in the military service. In many republics, it is a requisite for making them eligible for voting and for increased participation in national politics. It enables them to become more familiar with the history of their country and current happenings in it. In many cases, these subjects are dealt with as part of the process of learning to be literate.

18. John J. Considine, New Horizons in Latin America (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1958), p. 226.

Military service has some other effects which broaden and educate the individuals and which act to better their life as civilians on completion of service. Much depends on the background of the individual, of course, since men from urban areas will have experienced at least some of the effects to a greater degree than those from rural areas. Life in a large and ordered community of men, subject to discipline and law which upholds rights as well as duties, and in which the observance of higher standards of dress, hygiene, and personal care is required, may represent a very marked change from former conditions for a great many of the men in service. Some may become acquainted with safety procedures applicable to their civilian pursuits. Some will be benefited by medical care. Travel and service in areas of the country outside their usual locality modifies the regional viewpoint which many Latin American men possess. A greater civic awareness and capability should result from military service for most of the men in Latin America who participate in it.

The armed forces can be important in supplementing a country's public works program. The Mexican Army builds barracks, schools, and hospitals, manages reforestation and irrigation projects, and helps keep the roads repaired. In Brazil, the Army explored the interior, set up communications lines, developed agricultural colonies, and helped the Indians to advance in civilization. The Peruvian and Bolivian Armies had similar tasks in the 1940's and 1950's respectively.¹⁹

19. Lieuwen, pp. 118 and 139.

Peru is still having road construction done by an Army unit, now equipped with modern roadbuilding machinery through the Mutual Security Program and organized as a Construction Engineering Battalion. The project of constructing a trans-Andean highway was speeded by flying some of the machinery to the eastern terminal of the road in chartered planes so that work could proceed simultaneously from both ends of the proposed road.²⁰ In labor surplus areas, the equipment need not be complex nor essentially labor-saving devices.

A comprehensive listing of the 1959 activities of the military in undertakings of a civic nature in Latin America is given in the Draper Report.²¹ Sometimes the armed forces, particularly the armies, are almost completely self-sufficient economic groups, raising their own food and operating factories which produce clothing and utensils. Competition with the civilian economy in these matters is not desirable as a general rule. However, insofar as such activities teach trades and modern methods, and especially where colonization of an unoccupied area is concerned, they are beneficial. It is, of course, undesirable that non-military activities detract from military capability and availability, but an appropriate balance can be maintained by continuous supervision.

20. The New York Times, June 25, 1961, sec. IV, p. 9; and August 13, 1961, sec. VI, p. 11.

21. Brig. Gen. Donald G. Shingler, "Contributions of Military Resources to Economic and Social Progress," Draper Report, Annex D, pp. 95-126.

Probably the armed forces of Latin America make their greatest contribution through engineering surveys rather than through actual construction or participation in economic activity. In many cases survey work cannot be performed except by groups under military discipline and with the incentive of military ends to be served as well as non-military benefits which accrue from the work. In the United States, the U.S. Army Engineers still have responsibility for river navigation and flood control. In Latin America, water conservation and irrigation projects may be even more important and can be undertaken at the same time by comparable units. The navies can do similar work in connection with hydrographic surveys and port development. Air forces do much aerial photography for map making and exploration.

Another group of military activities which is not in competition with civilian occupations is in the realm of sanitation, epidemic control, and medical care and research. In isolated areas, these are not apt to be practiced except by military units, and even the municipal governments may not be well organized to cope with problems in these fields and may therefore welcome assistance from the armed forces.

Actually, there are a great many non-military functions which the armed forces could and do perform. These abilities may be very useful in emergencies, and emergencies arise with great frequency in Latin America because the civilian economy is not so well developed as to cover many activities in depth or offer alternate courses of action.

Thus even the use of military trucks and labor to save a crop is much more important to some Latin American countries than it would be to the United States. There are many other activities further up the technological scale which may have important use in emergencies.

U.S. military personnel are not assigned to Latin America in sufficient number to provide field assistance to these activities except in a limited advisory capacity. They can and do help to train members of the Latin American armed forces to acquire the necessary fundamental skills.

There is a great need for the state to perform various tasks in connection with basic industries in Latin America. This condition arises because the Latin American nations wish to operate their own utility and transportation companies, and because it is very difficult to build and operate these facilities at a profit due to public resistance to the setting of rates at appropriate levels. In addition, these industries require a very large capitalization which often is obtainable only through inter-governmental arrangements. The industries no longer attract foreign private capital, and the public in Latin America has lost confidence in the utilities as an area of private investment. As a result, the ownership of public utilities has tended to pass from private to public hands.²² Often the politicians and the civil service employees are reluctant to assume high

22. John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 187-188.

positions in these industries because of the public's adverse reaction to failures of service, difficulties in setting rates, or labor problems which arise. Thus, military officers, who are less affected by these considerations and who have the requisite technical training, often are placed in positions of leadership in industry. The Alliance for Progress may require that this become even more common, because many of the projects which will be submitted under this program hinge upon adequate power and communications facilities.

The armed forces pervade the political and economic life of Latin America to a considerable extent, in addition to fulfilling the normal military role. In some of the state-operated industries, their influence may increase in an effort to give these industries stability and adequate managerial talent. Military influence may increase also in the development of relatively isolated areas as the ability of the armed forces to perform some of the desired civic activities is augmented. In other sectors of the national life, the influence of the military leaders is being constrained by the growth of other powerful groups, by the increasing complexity of certain non-military pursuits, and by the professional requirements of their services. The modernizing and professionalizing of the Latin American armed forces have been achieved at least in part and they have had several observable effects. The extent to which these processes may be attributable directly to the influence of U.S.

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military programs cannot be measured, but surely it would be fair to say that U.S. assistance has been a very important factor in it.

CHAPTER VI

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The role which the Latin American armed forces play in support of the Organization of American States and the United Nations may be influential in determining the character of these forces now and in the future.

The military forces of Latin America made a start toward professionalism when it became necessary for them to assume a role as protectors of the national boundaries—when nationalistic sentiments within the republics made expansion a fact and the need for protection a reality. The armed forces gained additional importance through support of national policies when the Latin American nations came to be accepted into the world community about 1905. About this date the Latin American republics were invited to participate in a conference of world powers for the first time—the Second Hague Peace Conference. The trend toward enhanced prestige for the armed forces continued and was intensified by participation in World War II. In the meantime, the development of arbitration procedures in the hemisphere had reached the point of reducing to some extent the importance of the armed forces as bulwarks of nationalism. Offsetting this trend, the development of international organizations has made the possession of modern armed forces a means of

acquiring status within the organizations. Many of the functions which the armed forces of Latin America are now carrying out, and which probably should be expanded in the national interests of Latin America, contribute to technicism, or concern with technical specialties, in the armed forces, and continued participation in political and economic life by the officers. If these officers now concern themselves more fully with the probable requirements of hemispheric defense and of the international organizations, trends toward professionalism, and therefore away from technicism and politics, will be accentuated.¹

The Organization of American States

The OAS is very much concerned with maintenance of peace in the hemisphere through non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes. In this, it rests on a history of more than fifty years of development, through declarations and resolutions, of the principles which were incorporated in the Charter of the OAS. However, continental security requirements dictate that the Charter also contain provisions for the use of force and limitations on that use, both as a means of insuring that the peaceful settlement procedures would be used and to counter aggression in the hemisphere.

1. The reasoning of this paragraph, and the meaning placed on the terms, follow those of Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957). The entire book concerns itself with this general subject, but the discussion of the U.S. armed forces on page 232 epitomizes the theme. Profession is contrasted with craft, not amateur status, and is practiced by the officers rather than the enlisted men, who are specialists in the application but not the management of violence. Cf. pp. 7-18 and 195-203.

At first, the measures to deal with aggression contemplated acts initiated by non-American states. It was agreed in a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers at Havana in 1940, that an act of aggression by a non-American state against an American state would be considered an act of aggression against all the American states. The Act of Chapultepec in 1945 extended the scope by applying the principle to any aggressor states, including American republics. Application of the principle to the Axis powers in World War II has already been described. The response to the threat posed by the Axis powers was mostly through bilateral treaties between the United States and the several republics of Latin America. U.S. strength was a necessary element in the success of essential undertakings in defense of the hemisphere. Hence the U.S. entered into agreements with several individual republics for defense preparations or for furthering the offensive operations in Africa and Europe.

The bilateral arrangements, like the Havana resolution itself, were brought about by the pressures of events and were improvised to cope with specific situations. A whole body of policies and procedures evolved through improvisation as the war progressed. The method proved to be effective in meeting the problems of the war, but a more formal system might have been even more effective, through forehandedness, had it been devised before the outbreak of World War II. As it was, the experiences of the war resulted in the growth

of a Latin American demand for the development of a hemispheric security system which would be effective for the postwar period.²

There was general agreement that inter-American problems should continue to be primarily the responsibility of the American states acting through a regional organization. Planning along these lines had been started as early as 1942. The inter-American system had given to Latin American republics a parity with the most powerful nation in the free world, insofar as decisions respecting hemisphere affairs were concerned, and the Charter of the OAS continues this juridical equality.³

The Charter could not give equality in military matters however, nor does it require of any country that it maintain armed forces. It continues the obligations agreed upon in the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 that the American states take positive action to meet an armed attack within the hemisphere, and that they act after consultation in cases of armed attack outside the hemisphere in which a member state is involved. However, no state is required to use armed force unless it consents to do so, and then only in implementation of a decision by two-thirds of the signatories in favor of imposing force as a sanction.⁴ Still, the Charter rests on the assumption that armed forces will be available to enforce the collective will.

2. Mechem, p. 245.

3. Mechem, pp. 249-250.

4. Mechem, pp. 282-284.

Individual nations call on the OAS for military assistance, as Costa Rica did when it was invaded from Nicaragua in 1955, with confidence that the nations which are known to have the requisite military strength will make it available under these circumstances.

While the Charter of the OAS does not require that any state maintain armed forces, it does invite maintenance of forces where they exist. It does so through the continuation of the Inter-American Defense Board and the establishment of an Advisory Defense Committee as subordinate elements to the organ of consultation of the OAS. The latter has never developed beyond the paper stage because the Defense Board itself seems to fulfill current military needs of the OAS. The Board has no armed forces under its direct control; it is a planning board only. Its present plans are realistic in their recognition that Latin America is a "Secondary Space" where direct attack by Communist forces is unlikely. Several vital, though smaller scale, functions remain, and furnishing of troops is not excluded, so planning by the Board is necessary if effectiveness in carrying out these functions is to be achieved. Standardization of weapons and training are Board recommendations which were adopted when the provisions of the Mutual Security Act were extended to include Latin America.⁵

The Inter-American Defense Board is active in terms of meetings, inspection tours, etc., but it has not produced

5. Mechem, pp. 329-334.

very much that has significantly changed the current hemisphere defense arrangements. The Annual Report of the Secretary General of the OAS for 1960 related that the Council of Delegates of the Board had held 35 meetings and 13 assemblies during the year. The report also indicated that one of the projects worked on by the Board was a study of collective aerial defense.⁶ Studies such as this may lead the American States toward assignment of forces to the OAS eventually, and hence to an operational role for the Defense Board. At the present time, the principal values of the Board are in making collaboration in joint defense easier through personal contact among military leaders of 19 nations, and in encouraging a more professional attitude among Latin American military personnel.⁷

Hemispheric defense continues to be founded on bilateral agreements, though it is now expected to counter aggression from any source. There are several short-run advantages of speed, flexibility, and independence gained from the use of bilateral agreements. However, there are also some long-run disadvantages inherent in the system of bilateral relations, principally through friction among Latin

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6. Organization of American States, 1960 Annual Report of the Secretary General to the Council of the Organization (Washington, D. C., 1961), p. 101.
 7. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, "The Organization of American States," Study no. 3, United States-Latin American Relations, Document no 125, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960, p. 218. Costa Rica no longer sends delegates and Cuba has been barred from participation.

American republics and through arousing nationalistic impulses which are directed against the United States. Increased use of the OAS would ameliorate some of these difficulties. Still, care must be taken that the OAS is not overloaded and that the U.S. does not dominate the Organization, upsetting the existing balance of national influence within it.

Strengthening hemispheric military capability within the OAS might best be done through the Inter-American Defense Board. Three proposals to accomplish this have been made.

- 1) The Board could furnish the membership for the Advisory Defense Committee and also such attaché services as may be needed for investigatory committees established by the Council, when it acts as an organ of consultation, and by the Inter-American Peace Committee. This course would permit the members of the Defense Board to share in the underlying tasks of war prevention through the OAS rather than to be isolated from them.
- 2) A small (100 man) force operated by the Defense Board at the command of the OAS Council to supplement the national forces of a threatened republic could serve as a starting point for gradual reduction of national forces by relieving them of some security duties.
- 3) Establishment of an inter-American staff college and mission unit to be operated by the Inter-American Defense Board, would intensify the present educational activity of the Board and further the professionalization of the Latin American military officers.⁸

8. Study No. 3, Senate Doc. No. 125, pp. 238-243.

Expansion of the functions of the Inter-American Defense Board would, in all probability, require some changes in the Charter of the OAS. Certainly this would be true if U.S. military aid were to be channeled through the OAS, as some U.S. Congressmen have proposed. Even though the forces now being trained and equipped with U.S. help under bilateral treaties can be used in joint efforts to counter aggression, some advantages would accrue from giving military assistance to the OAS for further distribution.⁹ However, the American states do not seem to be ready to accept major changes to the Charter. Besides, increased use of the OAS for military purposes should be concurrent with increased reliance on the Organization to implement other policies which affect all or most of the American republics. Otherwise, the social and economic functions of the OAS may be submerged. The United States has not shown great disposition to act through the OAS in any of these areas. U.S. aircraft carrier task force patrols off the Dominican Republic in 1961¹⁰ represent continuance of unilateral action in Latin America and bilateral relations with Latin countries. Continued bypassing of the OAS will hinder tendencies to strengthen it and may ultimately jeopardize its existence, so it would seem that the U.S. should make an effort to operate through the Organization to the extent that this is feasible.

9. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings to Amend the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960, p. 352.

10. The New York Times, November 20, 1961, p. 1.

The desire to preserve the OAS was strongly indicated by the actions and expressions of the Latin American republics at the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay early in 1962. A major cause of the inability of the American nations to agree unanimously on the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS was due to concern over the legality of the proceedings, since the Charter made no provision for expulsion. Some fear was expressed that lack of unanimity imperiled the continued effectiveness of the Organization. The U.S. view, on the other hand, was that the ability to arrive at a majority opinion was more indicative of strength than would be a unanimous stand which suppressed opposing views.¹¹ Still, the difficulties experienced in reaching a consensus indicate that the OAS is not well equipped to deal with such problems. This points to a danger that the Organization will increasingly be bypassed, unless steps to strengthen it are initiated.

Latin America and the United Nations

Preservation of the inter-American security system has been a primary goal of the Latin American republics for many years. It caused them to lead the movement to retain autonomous regional organizations within the UN while recognizing the paramount authority of the United Nations for the enforcement of actions to preserve peace. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals had seemed incompatible with the provisions of the Act of Chapultepec for the use of force

11. The New York Times, February 3, 1962, p. 2.

to meet aggression in the western hemisphere. The former specifically stated that "no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." Unless the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were modified, the inter-American system, which had acquired world-wide respect and prestige, would have been made subject to a UN veto, and the Latin American nations objected strongly to this condition. A compromise was reached whereby the inherent right of states to take individual or collective action in self-defense was not impaired by the Charter of the UN, nor was the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take necessary action affected by the exercise of the right of self-defense. Senator Vandenberg provided this formula to accommodate the Latin American view, which had been forcefully presented to the U.S. delegates in informal gatherings at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco.

The inter-American security system thus was integrated into the United Nations. Nevertheless, its freedom of action is subjected to certain limitations. The OAS can take no enforcement action on its own initiative, except in case of self-defense, but must obtain authorization from the Security Council. The Security Council must be kept informed of disputes arising in the hemisphere and of action taken respecting them. The Council can intervene to act for itself, but would be expected to do so only if the OAS were ineffective. And a dispute may be taken directly to the Council

without reference to the OAS. Thus far, the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council has not affected enforcement action in the hemisphere, but the possibility remains that the veto may be used to this end. In order to remain autonomous, the OAS will have to continue development of its peaceful settlement procedures and also its means of insuring that these procedures are used and respected.¹²

The OAS and the United Nations have many similarities --in their basic structure, their exercise of similar functions, and in their pursuit of several identical purposes. Some differences arise out of their dissimilar origins and scope. The regional organization has a long history of development of procedures well suited to the continent. The universal organization is newer and is still devising methods for coping with world problems, for which purpose it has also developed organs not found in the OAS.¹³

The United Nations, like the OAS, expects its members to contribute such military power as is necessary to accomplish the desired ends of preserving peace. The obligation is to be interpreted by each sovereign nation as it sees fit, but all the republics of the Western Hemisphere are cognizant of it. That only one Latin American nation contributed armed forces to the UN forces in Korea has been cited as indicative of a narrow view of hemisphere defense.¹⁴ Actually, several

12. Mecham, pp. 246-277.

13. Manuel Canyes, The Organization of American States and the United Nations (4th ed.; Washington, D. C., Pan American Union, 1958), p. 18.

14. Lieuwen, pp. 209-210.

countries offered small contingents, often volunteers, for service in Korea, but these were not accepted because the United States had decided that units numbering less than 1000 could not be employed effectively. Many also offered foodstuffs, materials, and cash.¹⁵ In modern warfare, even of the police type, troops with a considerably greater level of training than would be expected of volunteer groups are apt to be roughly handled. Colombia, for instance, furnished an infantry battalion for combat duty in Korea, and it suffered heavy casualties.

In 1951, U.S. Congressmen expressed disappointment at the small scope of Latin American participation in the Korean War. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs reminded them that the equipment of the Latin American countries was not in good enough condition to prepare them for modern warfare. He pointed out that "if we look to the countries of Latin America to help us in connection with an operation such as Korea, then we must be prepared to look at the state of readiness of their armed forces." He added that the cost of maintaining forces in Korea was a difficult problem for many of the Latin American nations. The United States, readying itself for the Korean action, could do little to furnish funds, equipment, or spare parts to Latin America.¹⁶ These conditions are reminiscent of those

15. Meham, pp. 430-431.

16. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1951, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 395-398.

which existed at the beginning of World War II. Certainly the Latin American republics are better prepared today to furnish forces if the UN should need them. The willingness of these countries to participate in UN affairs can perhaps be determined only by a showdown in the event of a crisis which requires cooperation of this sort. For the present, at least, there seems to be little reason to doubt that Latin America will respond as promptly as in the past and that the forces offered will be more acceptable than on former occasions.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In discussing the Latin American armed forces and the cooperative efforts by the United States which contributed to the attainment of their present status, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that many of the conditions were the result of rather radical changes introduced quite recently. The seriousness of the Nazi threat to the hemisphere, only twenty-two years ago, caused the United States to enter into close military relations with Latin American nations for the first time in its history. The sending of Brazilian combat troops to Italy was the first participation of this kind in an overseas campaign by any Latin American republic.¹

The newness of U.S. military cooperation with Latin America makes judgment of results difficult enough, but lack of continuity in it makes assessment harder still. Had the assistance efforts been uninterrupted, U.S. influence might have had a more favorable political effect. The years from 1945 to 1952, during which the U.S. ceased to furnish military assistance to Latin America on a scale which approached that of the years before and after that time, was the period when some military leaders in Latin America made their preparations for accession to power, resulting in some of the most

1. Mecham, p. 195 and p. 227.

odious dictatorships experienced by their countries. There are, of course, many other factors which permitted their ascendancy. It is worth noting, also, that these dictators were superseded in the years after U.S. military assistance was resumed in some of these countries, and that the least which might be said is that U.S. aid did not prevent their demise.

In fact, the U.S. has come to take an active part in fostering social reform in Latin America, and the Alliance for Progress is indicative of this trend. The military assistance programs seem to be consistent with this aim. Some of the pressure for social change, as well as support for it, comes in part from the citizens whose horizons have been broadened by education received while in the military service. Some of the support comes also from officers who have developed interests which are more professional and less political. In both cases, U.S. military assistance is a contributory factor. To this extent it has prepared the way for, and should now work toward the success of, the more inclusive Alliance for Progress.

The Latin American republics have frequently been told that they were not recipients of a larger share of aid funds disbursed by the U.S. in prior years because they did not need programs such as the Marshall Plan—that U.S. expenditures in Europe and Asia achieved results which contributed to Latin American security as well as to that of the United States. Now the conditions are almost reversed—Europe is

prosperous and stable and Communist incursions there have been halted, while the Latin American economy is suffering and Communism has intruded its influence into the hemisphere. This intrusion requires that military preparedness—among other things—be maintained at a high level in order to counter the expansionist tendencies of Communism. It seems that, as a minimum, flexibility of military action should be increased by removing the present ceiling on the amount which may be expended on military assistance to Latin America. There seems to be little likelihood that reversal of conditions will be complete—that the hemisphere, rather than Europe, will have first call on the wealth and military strength of the United States—but events may cause a sizable increase in the proportion of military and economic aid distributed to Latin America.

An increase in expenditures is not a necessary nor an automatic response to removal of a ceiling on them, though it is a likely result. More to the point is a judgment as to whether or not military aid should be intentionally increased as a means of expanding the social and civic effects of the military services. A large number of the more vocal and influential groups in Latin America have an aversion for the United States, unwarranted, in the eyes of many Americans, but present. They are able to block some of the programs which are being worked out under the Alliance for Progress and which are already so late in starting that they may be inadequate to meet minimum needs by the time they get moving. Expansion

of military assistance is rather easy and rapid, and meets little opposition. The armed forces have the supervisory organization, often better disciplined and more accountable than those of other government agencies, the manpower pool, and expansible projects of civic betterment which are already under way in some cases. This may not be the most efficient way possible to get interim programs going, but in some areas it may be the most efficient method immediately available. Increasing aid in this way is subject to limitation, however, by the fact that bilateral treaties have been made with only twelve republics.

Extension of the Mutual Security Act to include nations which do not now have bilateral agreements with the U.S. might be desirable, but it might simply add complications if the attempt were made to negotiate such agreements at the same time that the Alliance for Progress is getting started. In the absence of such agreements, however, it would seem advantageous to achieve the same ends through an expansion of the military planning and liaison functions of the OAS, with a view to channeling some assistance to individual countries through that body eventually.

If the solution of Latin American questions increasingly will involve the OAS, preliminary steps to strengthen the Organization, with provisions for continued growth, should be initiated. A complete discussion of the possibilities for expanding the OAS involves much more than military programs, but these must be given consideration also. Fulfillment of

the aims of the Alliance for Progress will undoubtedly result in competition for the funds which the Latin American republics currently authorize for the support of their military establishments. At the same time, greater collaboration between the armed forces and civilian agencies probably will be sought, particularly insofar as projects which add to basic capabilities of the nations are concerned, projects such as port development or pipeline construction. Increased military cooperation within the OAS can contribute to the acceptability of both competitive and collaborative processes.

As the Latin American armed forces become more modernized and more deeply committed to joint defense, economies may be effected through division of labor and sharing of installations within a joint military organization. NATO provides an example which, while vastly different from the Latin American situation in many basic aspects, offers some precedents which may be applicable to the OAS. Quite obviously, these precedents need not be adopted without modification, and the situation in the hemisphere is not so pressing as to require a rapid shift to agencies and policies which NATO has found desirable for its purposes. Nevertheless, the experiences of NATO in its evolution would seem to have meaning for the OAS which has not yet been reflected in its organization or in the uses made of that body.

Earlier chapters have indicated that U.S. military programs, as they apply to Latin America, have not been very large nor comprehensive. There has not been widespread

agreement, either in the United States or in the Latin American republics, as to the need for or the content of these programs, much less a sense of urgency in connection with the threats these programs are intended to counter. Communist inroads in the hemisphere and the existence of social and economic conditions which foster receptivity to Communist influence are readily recognized, but the emphasis is on political and financial action rather than readying armed forces for more extensive efforts to overcome these conditions, or the potential situations which they may evoke.

One can hardly argue that the financial measures now in progress should be restrained out of consideration for the desirability of integrating them through the OAS. They are not very large in scale, nor are they proceeding rapidly, and they seem belated even now. Yet expansion of the Alliance for Progress seems inevitable, and with this expansion will arise some problems which are of a joint nature, such as development of rivers which form the boundary between two republics or economic issues involving a customs union. The air of crisis which now surrounds much of the activity undertaken in implementation of the Alliance for Progress indicates the desirability of early negotiation within the OAS of as many incipient problems as lend themselves to resolution by that body. Certainly this is true for problems which are primarily military, but it is also appropriate to many efforts of a public works nature which have military implications in some measure.

Cooperation in a joint military venture increases the sense of hemispheric solidarity, as was the case for Latin American participants in World War II and in the Korean War. In fact, some analysts believe that the U.S., though technically correct, erred in not enhancing solidarity by accepting Latin American units for service in these actions, no matter how small or limited. In peacetime, the only equivalent means of achieving community of interest through existing organizations is in the Inter-American Defense Board. The Board has done much of its work in peripheral areas because the principal cooperative military effort, that involving the U.S., has been conducted through bilateral treaties. This is not an unalterable condition. The Board has worked harmoniously for several years, and there seems to be no serious impediment to growth in the area of training and coordination of logistic support. Such a development would enhance the Board's responsibilities, and hence prestige, but would not entail command functions, which some countries are reluctant to entrust to the Board. NATO has found it necessary to take this last step too, and it may be that the OAS will feel a similar need at some future date. If the Defense Board were allowed to gain additional experience through handling more peace time functions, it would make the transition to command an easier one.

Standardization of arms and training is an aim that both the OAS and NATO are already pursuing but inter-organization cooperation in these matters could be fruitful, especially

since some Latin American countries already have some European equipment. A proposal for a War College administered by the OAS, probably resembling the NATO Defense College, has already been mentioned. Cooperation in technical agencies, such as NATO's Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development or its signals agencies, would be a logical development. More intensive study of the NATO command organization and the NATO common infrastructure might subsequently be very beneficial to the OAS. United States officers with NATO experience would be available for assistance if the OAS were to organize along these lines at some future time. However, if arrangements were made for the Inter-American Defense Board to assign observers (or perhaps operating personnel) to the NATO staff now, the Board would gain in insight and in its experience level.

Participation in NATO would result in a better appreciation by Latin America of the world-wide commitments of the U.S. The Latin American governments have perhaps been overly concerned with a restricted, merely regional outlook. Debates and diplomatic contact in the United Nations and the OAS are forums in which Latin America becomes acquainted with U.S. world interests. However, close contact with a body which actually has a voice in evaluating and determining the U.S. military force levels and expenditures in Europe would give the Latin American governments a more convincing picture of the extent of U.S. security efforts. Meaningful international policies must be world policies, in which regional

organizations have an appropriate part. At present, this is more descriptive of U.S. policy than it is of the interests of the Latin American republics.

If the opposite course were adopted--if Latin American armed forces were greatly reduced or if their role in hemisphere defense were downgraded considerably, hemispheric solidarity would probably suffer. If the republics of Latin America were relieved of responsibilities, they would lose contact with the realities of defense requirements, and therefore become impatient with the U.S. in these matters. One of the current causes of U.S.-Latin American misunderstanding in economic and political matters is a lack of realism in the Latin American concepts of U.S. involvement in these areas. It would seem most undesirable to diminish understanding of the facts behind common defense under present conditions.

If neither expansion nor contraction of the role of the OAS, and consequently of the Inter-American Defense Board, is likely, there is still the possibility that the Board as presently constituted could do more, such as prepare and supervise combined exercises² with existing national forces. In the past, most exercises involving more than one country have been those connected with the visits of U.S. naval forces, composed of one or more submarines and several ASW

2. According to current usage, combined operations are those involving the forces of two or more nations, while joint operations are those in which two or more services of a single country participate.

vessels, which made annual cruises for the purpose of operating with the ASW forces of as many Latin American countries in succession as possible. The duration of these cruises varied, depending on the over-all commitments of U.S. naval forces. The exercises seemed to be very productive and to have been well received by the participating countries, but such limited efforts could hardly be considered sufficient to meet the training needs of Latin American forces. Naturally these nations conducted training within their own forces. However, combined exercises can help to fulfill the requirements for more advanced training of these forces, augmenting their experience, and they also expose, for subsequent solution, some of the problems which operations of this nature usually evoke.

The sharing of services between neighboring states, such as the operation of Colombian ASW vessels with Venezuelan submarines, is a type of activity which can be expanded. Cooperation of this sort does not necessarily require the services of the Inter-American Defense Board, but to act through the Board allows the accrual of some advantages of the sort mentioned in the case of more comprehensive combined exercises. The forces available to many Latin American nations are relatively small, and the experience of their senior officers is correspondingly limited. Rotation through planning and logistics bodies which might be established within the Defense Board to coordinate sharing arrangements would broaden the experience of many officers, and their

prestige as well. To the extent that wider experience would be reflected in more realism in planning, the current functions of the Board would be more capably performed.

It is possible, of course, that the U.S. might be able to increase its participation in combined exercises. However, the U.S. is heavily committed in other geographic areas as well as in its own training efforts. Besides, there is no assurance that more widespread U.S. involvement would serve the purpose of improving Latin American training as well as would acceleration and coordination efforts made by the Latin Americans themselves. Among the criticisms of U.S. military policies in the past has been a persistent and frequently voiced belief that the U.S. tutelage is excessive.

Much of what has been said here would suggest, then, that the United States should continue its military programs in Latin America, and that it should be willing to expand them in a manner consistent with the requirements which the evolution of the organizational and professional capabilities of the Latin American republics, both individually and as a group, generates. There seems to be no need for a crash program of any sort, nor any way to accommodate one if it were begun. There does seem to be ample room for continued growth of U.S. aid to Latin American military development.

The process of building up the Latin American armed forces, not only in strength but in modernity of equipment and outlook, has been sketched in previous chapters. It has been attended by fairly sizable expenditures of money and

effort on the part of the United States, but also by frustrations. The strengthened forces have sometimes seemed to support dictatorial regimes against the wishes of the populace, though many of them have now been toppled. On the other hand, the strengthening has not been sufficient to permit Latin America to furnish armed support in world conflicts. Still, the U.S. military programs in Latin America have improved the foundation on which further betterment will rest, and it is injudicious to fail to strengthen democratic governments simply because aid has, in the past, strengthened authoritarian governments.

Concern over intervention has been a dominant factor in inter-American relations. Even now it makes forceful action difficult, despite the presence in Cuba of what the U.S. government, and others, view as a clear threat to the hemisphere. The OAS, as the instrument of the governments that comprise it, can do no more than they decide it shall do.³ On the other hand, it cannot carry out decisions if it lacks appropriate machinery and strength. Non-intervention can only be a reality so long as an adequate system of security is available to all American states.⁴ Such security is based on appropriate armed forces, over which effective control is exercised.

3. Mecham, pp. 464-465.

4. John C. Drier, "Organizing Security in the Americas," American Military Policy, ed. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1957), p. 254.

The collective security system is based even more fundamentally on the ability of the U.S. to continue its contributions to stability in many parts of the world. Diminution of Latin America's strength would inevitably impair that ability on the part of the United States. This would be a retrogressive effect, because as world tensions increased, the U.S. would feel it necessary to divert military strength from other theaters to the hemisphere, especially if some of the causes of tension arose within the American states. World conditions and American security seem to argue the necessity of continuing and developing more fully the U.S. military programs and the Latin American armed forces.

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